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I. INTRODUCTION
We are at an extraordinary and perilous moment in our
nation's history as we struggle through a financial crisis that
former Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. has called "a
once or twice in a hundred year event."' The financial markets in
the United States have been in serious turmoil and upheaval since
the summer of 2007, and this extraordinary period of financial
turbulence is now well into its second year. The current financial
crisis is illustrated by the strained condition of financial markets
and the dramatic and prolonged slowdown of the broader
economy. At the close of 2008, Wall Street finished its worst year
since 1931, and the housing market finished its worst year in
recorded history. Perhaps as a sign of the confusion and
complexity of these times, no one seems to know quite what to call
this particular crisis that we find ourselves in. Is it a "financial
crisis?" A "credit crunch?" The "Wall Street crisis?" The "Great
Intervention?" Or, better yet, the "global meltdown?"
Nonetheless, even while each of us might label this consequential
period by different terms, there is one thing that we can all agree
on: the current financial crisis is likely to be judged in retrospect as
the most wrenching and challenging since the end of the Second
World War.
The proximate cause of the financial turmoil was the steep
increase and subsequent sharp decline of housing prices
nationwide in recent years, which, together with poor lending
practices, led to large losses on mortgages and mortgage-related
instruments at a wide range of financial institutions. As long as
housing prices kept climbing, fueled by ever-increasing levels of
debt and leveraging, these problems remained hidden. But in
2006, when prices peaked and began to fall, things started to
unravel and come undone, and the "emperor" was found to have
no clothes. After years of unsustainable housing price
1. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks at the
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.
treas.gov/press/releases/hp1285.htm.
2. Edward L. Glaeser, New York, New York: America's Resilient City, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/30/new-york-new-
york-americas-resilient-city/?hp.
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
appreciation and imprudent lending practices, a housing correction
- the bursting of the bubble-was both inevitable and necessary.3
This financial crisis, marked by a plethora of home foreclosures
and illiquid mortgage-related assets which have created a capital
hole on the balance sheets of banks and financial institutions, has
spilled over into the greater economy, causing a global credit
crunch and fueling a deep, long, and painful recession.'
It is helpful to remember that we are not only in an
economic recession, but in a serious banking crisis as well. The
reckless lending practices and irresponsible risk-taking conducted
by many of our financial institutions during this era of
deregulation have proven quite costly for the U.S. economy and its
taxpayers. We have already seen and continue to see on a daily
basis the financial crisis' devastating effects on homeowners with
higher mortgage default and foreclosure rates affecting individuals
and neighborhoods. And, since the first signs of financial trouble
appeared, we have seen the continuing impact on financial
institutions, asset classes, markets, and a financial system that is
integral to the everyday lives of all Americans. As hundreds of
billions of dollars in mortgage-related investments went sour,
mighty investment banks that once ruled Wall Street and formed
the foundation of our financial markets have shrunk, dissolved, or
reinvented themselves as bank holding companies by converting
their nonbank bank affiliates into traditional commercial banks
while thousands of white-collar jobs have been eliminated. The
financial crisis has felled some of the most storied financial
institutions such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers; brought
Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, A.I.G., Citigroup, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac to their knees; prompted the failures of large savings
and loan companies Washington Mutual (WaMu), which was
taken over by JPMorgan, and IndyMac Bank; and eliminated the
3. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on
Housing and Capital Markets before the New York Society of Securities Analysts
(Jan. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp757.htm.
4. See Turmoil in US Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government
Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008)
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors,
U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., and Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury).
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final two large independent investment banks - Morgan Stanley
and Goldman Sachs. As three financial giants, Citigroup, Merrill
Lynch, and Wachovia, reported multibillion dollar losses in the fall
of 2008, the finance industry recognized that all of the combined
profits that major banks earned from early 2004 until the middle of
2007 - some $305 billion - have disappeared. Between July 2007,
when the credit crisis began, and mid-October 2008, the country's
nine largest banks and financial institutions marked down their
valuations on loans and other troubled assets by a combined $323
billion.6 This statistic was released before Wachovia's $23.9 billion
write-down on October 22, 2008 - the largest ever for a bank and,
coming on top of $10 billion of losses earlier this year, wipes out
nearly all of the profits the firm earned since the merger of First
Union and Wachovia formed the new Wachovia in 2001. 7
Goldman Sachs, coveted and respected for avoiding much of the
fallout that had severely shaken its Wall Street rivals and a
seemingly formidable institution on many fronts, reported a net
loss of $2.12 billion for its quarter ended November 28, 2008-its
first quarterly loss since it went public in 1999-as it also faced
substantial write-downs on distressed assets ranging from private
equity to commercial real estate.8 Goldman Sachs' closest rival-
Morgan Stanley-was fortunate to avoid losses in the prior three
quarters of 2008 but incurred a $2.37 billion fiscal fourth-quarter
loss caused by asset write-downs and losses on its bond business
due to the financial crisis, although it still managed to report a full-
year profit of $1.59 billion.9
Uncertainty and a lack of confidence have clogged our
basic financial plumbing as the channels of credit - the arteries of
5. Louise Story & Eric Dash, Banks Are Likely to Hold Tight to Bailout Money,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/1O/17/business/17bank.
html?em.
6. Id.
7. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Wachovia Reports Historic Loss, WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
2008, at D1.
8. Susanne Craig, Goldman Posts Its First Loss, Reflecting Altered Landscape,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122942230406210193.
html; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Goldman's $2.1 Billion Loss Ends Long Winning Streak,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/goldman-
sachs-reports-fourth-quarter-loss/?emc=etal.
9. Louise Story, Morgan Stanley Posts $2.36 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/business/18morgan.html?emc=etal.
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the global financial system - have constricted. When banks cannot
finance at reasonable levels and cannot or are not willing to lend,
everyone who depends on credit suffers. Rippling effects from a
worsening economy have trickled down from Wall Street into
Main Street as the capital markets-the pipes through which
money flows to finance student loans, car loans, home loans,
family needs, and small businesses' payroll and inventory - fell
victim to the credit freeze. These drastic events have reverberated
far beyond the trading floors of Wall Street and board rooms of
corporate America, as almost no industry has been spared as the
crisis that first emerged in the subprime mortgage market
metastasized. The stock market plummeted. The credit markets
froze. Hundreds of billions of dollars that Americans invested in
retirement accounts, stocks, and mutual funds have evaporated.
All told, about $7 trillion of shareholders' wealth - the gains of
the last six years - was wiped out in a year of incredibly turbulent
market swings. Homeowners are watching as the value of their
homes plummet and housing foreclosures skyrocket. Families
worry about how they will afford basic commodities such as
groceries and gasoline. Unemployment is rising. Consumer
spending is weakening. Manufacturers are cutting production.
Interest rates on corporate bonds - which reflect investor fears of
default - are soaring, which will almost inevitably cause sharp
declines in business spending. Two of the nation's three largest
automobile manufacturers - Chrysler and General Motors - each
received an emergency bailout to provide liquidity and/or prevent
imminent bankruptcy, giving them a few months to restructure and
stabilize their businesses. Many colleges and universities are
announcing hiring freezes, postponing construction projects,
increasing tuition, or putting off planned capital campaigns. A
global recession is underway. There surely are more economic
shocks in store, including increased unemployment, more
corporate defaults, and state and local government budget
emergencies. The quintessential image of this crisis might very
well be, on the one hand, the many families gathering around their
kitchen tables each night asking how they will weather this storm
and, on the other hand, the many individuals, ranging from young
professionals to retirees, who lie awake late into the night
[Vol. 13
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worrying about how they will even survive this turbulent financial
storm.
In the last year, the federal government has pledged
trillions of dollars to help resolve the financial crisis, including $1.7
trillion in loans to companies that use hard-to-sell securities as
collateral, $3 trillion in government purchases of stock, corporate
debt, and mortgages, and $3.1 trillion in government guarantees of
corporate bonds, money market funds, and money in some deposit
accounts.' ° The government's assumption of $7.8 trillion in direct
and indirect obligations amounts to almost half the size of the
entire national economy and far surpasses the controversial $700
billion financial rescue package (bailout bill) passed by Congress
in early October 2008.
This tumultuous combination amounts to what Richard
Berner, the co-head of global economics at Morgan Stanley, calls a
"perfect storm" for U.S. households. 2 Alan Blinder, a professor of
economics at Princeton University and former vice chairman of
the Federal Reserve, believes that the economy "has fallen off a
cliff,', 13 while John Thain, chairman and chief executive of Merrill
Lynch until its merger with Bank of America at year-end 2008, has
stated that the global economic slowdown is not like the most
recent slowdowns seen in 2001, 1998, or 1987, but is, rather, quite
comparable to the period after the debilitating 1929 stock market
crash known as the Great Depression.' 4 The National Bureau of
Economic Research, a prestigious and widely cited U.S.
independent economic authority, pronounced before the close of
2008 that the nation has been in a recession since December 2007.
Newly elected President Barack Obama has sounded resigned to
inheriting a starkly troubled and reeling economy. 5 Perhaps the
10. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Details $800 Billion Loan Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2008, at Al.
11. Id.
12. James Politi & Krishna Guha, Households face 'perfect storm,' FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b95e936-963e-lldd-9dce-000077bO7658.html.
13. Krishna Guha, US faces its worst recession in 26 years, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=fto101920081731.437208&refe
rrer -id =yahoofinance.
14. Greg Farrell, Merril chief sees sever global slowdown, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=ftolll120080957111501.
15. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Victory Speech at Grant Park,
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most dangerous consequence of this economic crisis is that our
collective confidence in our nation's future, the economy's
resilience, our productivity and entrepreneurial spirit, and our
ability to achieve the widely sought after American dream has
been badly shaken and tarnished to a significant degree.
Entrenched problems of financial excess and overextension
had developed over the past decade, and many share
responsibility: overextended homeowners, unduly aggressive
mortgage lenders, financial engineers who created new financial
technologies, and banking and finance executives who, along with
government regulators, grossly underestimated the risks to the
financial markets.' 6 What is the nature of the crisis? Who or what
caused this mess? The details can be incredibly complex, but the
basics are pretty simple. As noted in a recent edition of
Newsweek: "[W]ho could have predicted that giving out loans like
Halloween candy to people with mini-salaries to buy mini-
mansions - who then used their home equity to buy gas-guzzling
Hummers - would ever backfire?"' 7
This article seeks to provide a practical and comprehensive
understanding of the financial crisis-how we ever got to this
point-as well as a sense of how this financial crisis,
unprecedented in its scale, monetary value, complexity, and the
speed with which it has happened, became not just a Wall Street
phenomenon, but one with painful and widespread ramifications
for ordinary Americans. Part II of this article discusses the origins
of the credit crisis and traces the genesis of the housing bubble, the
emergence and prominence of subprime lending, and the advocacy
of increased homeownership as a social and political goal." Part
III sets forth the development of financial engineering and the
growth of complex financial instruments and technologies on Wall
Chicago, Il. (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://edition.cnn.com2008/POLITICS/11/04/
obama.transcript (noting that "the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the
greatest of our lifetime," including "the worst financial crisis in a century," and that
"[t]he road ahead will be long," the "climb will be steep," and "[w]e may not get
there in one year, or even one term").
16. Steve Lohr, Government's Into Banking Has Its Perils, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/business/18system.html.
17. Steve Tuttle, It's Just a Flesh Wound, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2008, http://www.
newsweek.com/id/163626.
18. See infra Part II and accompanying text.
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Street that contributed to the financial crisis through the process of
securitization. 9 Part IV of the article discusses the "originate-to-
distribute" securitization model and the critical incentives
securitization inherently creates to underestimate risk. ° Part V
chronicles how the housing crisis morphed into a banking crisis
and discusses the fallout that financial markets and financial
institutions have witnessed first-hand since the middle of 2007.21
Part VI provides a synopsis of the development of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), popularly referred to
as the "bailout bill," and the mechanisms the federal government
has used and is in the process of using in order to counteract the
forces of this recession.22  Finally, Part VII discusses several
broader themes aimed at first achieving economic recovery and
stability and restoring badly needed confidence and, second,
repairing the greater financial system.23
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CREDIT CRISIS
A. Federal Reserve Interest Rate Reductions
The roots of the credit crisis stretch back to another
notable boom-and-bust in recent history: the tech bubble of the
late 1990s. In 1998, turmoil was rampant in the financial markets.
The spectacular failure of Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM), a United States hedge fund, in the late 1990s led to a
massive bailout by other major banks and investment houses and
helped persuade the Federal Reserve to provide three quick
interest rate cuts that contributed to the dot-coin bubble. When
the stock market began a steep decline in 2000 and the nation
slipped into a recession the next year, the Federal Reserve, once
again, sharply lowered interest rates to diminish the blow of the
collapse of the dot-corn bubble and combat the risk of deflation.
From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds
rate target-the interest rate at which depository institutions lend
19. See infra Part III and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part V and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part VI and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part VII and accompanying text.
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balances to each other overnight-from 6.5% to 1.0%.24 In the
aftermath of the tragic September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Federal Reserve cut the federal funds rate in half, to 1.75%, and
this rate remained below 2.0% for almost three years.
This series of actions by the Federal Reserve to lower
interest rates and hold them at historically low levels for three
years partially fueled the housing bubble and eventual crash that
triggered the subprime mortgage quagmire and current financial
25
crisis. The Federal Reserve believed that interest rates could be
lowered safely primarily because the risk of inflation was
perceived as low. Richard W. Fisher, president and chief executive
officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, however, stated
that the Federal Reserve's interest rate policy during this time
period was misguided by erroneously low inflation data and
thereby contributed to the housing bubble." These low nominal
rates, negative in real inflation adjusted terms, sparked a building
and buying boom in housing that developed into a huge
speculative bubble. Lower interest rates made mortgage payments
cheaper, caused increased demand for homes, sent home prices
skyward, and encouraged investors to pour money into the U.S.
mortgage market. In addition, millions of homeowners took
advantage of the rate drop to refinance their existing mortgages.
Yet, while the industry flourished and the quantity of mortgages
rose, the quality of the mortgages went down. When the Federal
Reserve brought rates back to 5.25% at the end of June 2006, the
bubble began to deflate; the housing correction that evolved into a
financial crisis began about one year later.
24. See Historical Changes of the Targeted Federal Funds and Discount Rates,
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfunds
data.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009); see also Monetary Policy and Open Market
Operations. Fed. Reserve Bd., http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
25. See Alex Binkley, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2006-2007.
III. Regulation of Exotic & Non-Traditional Mortgages, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 21, 23 (2007); see also CSI: credit crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007, http://
www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story-id=9972489.
26. Richard W. Fisher, President & Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank
of Dallas, Confessions of a Data Dependent: Remarks before the New York
Association for Business Economics (Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.dallasfed.
org/news/speeches/fisher/2006/fs061102.cfm.
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A study conducted by Stanford University Professor John
B. Taylor suggests that the federal government could have avoided
a large portion of the turmoil associated with the financial crisis if
the Federal Reserve had not "cut rates so deeply and ... raised
them back up more quickly., 27 Taylor's simulated study increased
interest rates more quickly than the Federal Reserve and resulted
in a smaller increase in new homes than what actually occurred in
recent years. These results illustrate that raising interest rates
sooner would have helped prevent the housing bubble and sharp
fall in the housing market, and, thereby, much of the current
financial crisis.
B. The Nature of the Lender - Borrower Relationship
As incomes rose due to the expansion of the American
economy, homeowners and lenders sought out one another in ever
increasing numbers since private homeownership is greatly desired
by most who can afford it. A substantial factor bolstering the
subprime mortgage crisis stems from the intrinsic nature of
lending. Lenders and borrowers typically engage in arms-length
business transactions where each side strives to advance its own
interests since the creditor-borrower relationship does not
generally constitute a fiduciary relationship requiring lenders to
28
safeguard the borrowers' interests. In fact, in the loan
underwriting process, lenders generally have no duty to refrain
from making a loan if they arguably should know that the
27. Sally Pittman, Comment, ARMS, but no Legs to Stand On: "Subprime"
Solutions Plague the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1097-98
(Summer 2008) (citing John B. Taylor, Stanford University, Presentation at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on Housing, Housing Finance, and
Monetary Policy: Housing and Monetary Policy 4-5 (Sept. 1, 2007) (describing the
relationship between monetary policy and the housing crisis), available at http://www.
kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2007/PDF/2007.09.04.Taylor.pdf).
28. Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of a Suitability Standard in the Mortgage
Lending Industry: The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fire of Change, 12 N.C.
BANKING INST. 21, 22 (2008); see also Shafer v. GSF Mortgage Corp., C1-02-1165,
2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 550, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 6, 2003) (finding that no
fiduciary relationship exists under state law between a mortgage broker and a
borrower); cf Rede v. Great Am. First Sav. Bank, No. 95-55616, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 747, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45,
50 (Cal. 1979) (finding that mortgage brokers owe fiduciary duties to borrowers
under California real estate law and principles of agency law).
20091
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borrowers cannot repay the loan.29 This is in large part because a
mortgage loan is recognized as "a business transaction where each
party seeks its own economic interest, rather than a relationship of
trust and confidence."3 ° While a lender has "no judicially imposed
duty to ensure a [borrower's] ability to repay the loan,"31 most
lenders, prior to the subprime mortgage boom, refused to make a
loan in which the borrower's ability to repay was doubtful.32
C. Overextended Homeowners
The events leading us to this point began many years ago,
starting with lax and imprudent lending practices by banks and
financial institutions, and furthered by borrowers buying houses
they could not afford and taking out mortgages they could not34
pay. In evaluating whether a particular borrower qualifies for a
mortgage loan, mortgage lenders typically look at a variety of
factors, including ability and willingness to repay the loan. Since
the real estate boom sparked excessive demand and drove up
housing prices, lenders lowered and weakened their underwriting
standards and crafted creative loans to provide money to high-risk
borrowers in order to purchase more expensive homes. As
29. See Hirsch, supra note 28, at 22 (citing Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v.
AmSouth Bank, 817 So.2d 665, 676-79 (Ala. 2001); Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr.
516, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); N. Trust Co. v. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095,
1102 (I1. App. Ct. 1995); United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 46-47 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1007
(Utah 1992)).
30. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 23 (citing Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr.
338, 347-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Lawrence v. Bank of Am., 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985); First Bank of Wakeeney v. Moden, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. 1984);
Dennison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243 (Kan. 1982); Tokarz v. Frontier
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089,1092 (Wash. 1982)).
31. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 23 (citing Peterson Dev. Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank,
284 Cal. Rptr. 367, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 283 Cal. Rptr. 53, 56-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Wagner, 161 Cal. Rptr. At 521;
N. Trust, 657 N.E.2d at 1102).
32. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 23.
33. See Hearing, supra note 4 (testimony of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury) (noting that the root cause of the financial crisis was the
collapse of the housing market in late 2006 and early 2007, triggered by "bad lending
practices").
34. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement on
Comprehensive Approach to Market Developments (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1l49.htm.
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housing prices inched higher, home buyers, betting on continued
house price appreciation, took out sizeable loans with little or no
documentation, no down payment, or without the income to
qualify for a conventional loan of the size they wanted. 35 Coupled
with an increase in loan incentives such as easy initial terms like no
money down or no or low payments for two years, these market
trends encouraged borrowers to become overextended and assume
costly and difficult mortgages in the belief that they would be able
to quickly refinance at more favorable terms. Total mortgage
origination volume, which historically amounted to approximately
$1 trillion a year, reached its peak at almost $4 trillion in 2003
when, due to "unprecedented rate cuts, homeowners refinanced,
took cash out of their home equity, and speculated that housing
prices would continue to rise indefinitely. 3 6 As home prices began
to appreciate, even prime borrowers became more willing to
assume risk to purchase homes. Nontraditional financing,
including mortgage commitments such as adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs) and interest-only mortgages which vary from
the traditional thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage, allowed buyers to
qualify for homes they otherwise could not afford under
traditional fixed-rate mortgage lending guidelines.
Yet while it might seem elementary, housing prices do not
always increase, interest rates do not always drop, borrowers
cannot always refinance whenever they choose, and housing can
be lost due simply to mortgage default. One unfortunate
consequence of the inflation of the housing market was that
mortgage brokers came to view their loans as well-secured by the
rising values of their real estate collateral and, therefore, failed to
focus sufficiently on borrowers' ability to repay.37 Millions of
35. See Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate
Mortgages, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 27 (2008).
36. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 44.
37. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Housing,
Mortgage Markets, and Foreclosures at the Fed. Reserve Sys. Conference on
Housing and Mortgage Markets, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2008l204a.htm (citing
Kristopher Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane Sherlund & Paul Willen (forthcoming),
Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press); Chris Mayer, Karen Pence, and Shane
Sherlund (2008), The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2008-59, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Washington, D.C. (Nov.
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homeowners took advantage of the interest rate drops to refinance
their existing mortgages, but once interest rates began to rise and
housing prices started to drop moderately in many parts of the
United States in late 2006 and early 2007, refinancing became
more difficult."' When housing price appreciation began to slow,
the consequences of weak underwriting, including little or no
documentation and zero or minimal required down payments,
became obvious. Some homeowners unable to refinance began to
default as their mortgage loans reset to higher interest rates and
payments or the amount of the loan exceeded the new lower
market value of the home.
For most households in the United States, "home equity - a
function of forced savings in fixed-rate mortgages plus long-term
real property appreciation" - has been the most substantial source
of wealth.39 This makes homeownership an efficient and effective
way to develop wealth as home equity remains the primary savings
mechanism for a substantial percentage of the U.S. population.0
Nontraditional financing also provided a windfall to existing
homeowners, which lenders capitalized on through the
encouragement of home equity withdrawals. Individuals and
families accessed and used this new source of credit to tap
previously illiquid home equity wealth through refinancing.
2008), available at http://www.federaIreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200859/200859abs.
html).
38. See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis
and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 295-96 (2008) (finding that
homeowners were able to refinance their mortgages with unfavorable terms thanks to
the increased equity they enjoyed with rising home prices); see also U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office, Briefing to the H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Subject:
Information on Recent Default and Foreclosure Trends for Home Mortgages and
Associated Economic and Market Developments 4 (2007), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d0878r.pdf (finding that the decline in housing prices across the
nation may have provided disincentives to borrowers to keep paying their mortgages
while making it more difficult to refinance or sell so as to avoid default or
foreclosure).
39. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The
Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2276 (2008).
40. Pittman, supra note 27, at 1096; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership
2.0, 102 Nw. U.L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2008) (citing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4 (2001); Brian K. Bucks,
Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:
Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. Bull., 2006,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf).
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Furthermore, a huge real estate speculative bubble in housing
prices caused millions of Americans to think of homes as a cash
investment instead of as a place to live. During 2005 and 2006,
nearly forty percent of homes purchased were not used as primary
residences, but were instead used for investment purposes or as
vacation homes.4'
This time period - the housing bubble - naturally saw
substantial increases in both homeownership and home values.
Homeownership rose to 67.4% of U.S. households in 2000 from
64% in 1994,42 and peaked in 2004 with an all-time high of about
69%. 43 Simply, the American dream seemed to be thriving. There
are two sides to every coin, however. While an admirable social
goal and a plus for the economy,44 increased homeownership has
come at a very substantial personal and financial cost to already
financially strapped consumers as it allowed too many individuals
and families to become overextended and hold mortgages they
simply could not afford. While the housing boom increased the
asset value of U.S. households, it also decreased personal savings,
with home equity loans replacing savings and personal
investments.4 ' Robert Shiller, a Yale University economist, has
41. See Les Christie, Homes: Big drop in speculation, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 30,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/30/real-estate/speculators fleeing-housing-mar
kets /index.htm.
42. David Streitfeld & Gretchen Morgenson, Building Flawed American Dreams,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/business/19cisneros
.html.
43. See Census Bureau Reports on Residential Vacancies and Homeownership,
U.S. Census Bureau, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr
307/q307press.pdf.
44. See Jacoby, supra note 39, at 2262 (noting that homeownership develops
household wealth and economic self-sufficiency, generates positive social-
psychological states, and promotes stable communities); Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure
Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 Hous. L.
REV. 683, 723-24 (2008); Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of
the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 77, 92-93 (2008)
(noting that a strong housing market can foster increased support for the sitting
government and provide greater national wealth and increased domestic
consumption); see also Cassandra Jones Havard, "Goin' Round in Circles"... and
Letting the Bad Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for
Uniform Broker Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737, 754-55 (2008) (noting that
homeownership provides access to quality education and promotes job stability, is a
path to wealth and asset accumulation for families, stabilizes neighborhoods, and
represents an investment in local economies and, thereby, fosters economic growth.).
45. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 93.
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analyzed home price appreciation since 1890 and concluded that
homes in the early 2000s were severely "overvalued at
unprecedented levels., 46 Between 1997 and 2006, American home
prices increased by 124%. 47 Although home prices nationwide
experienced rapid price appreciation, increases were "especially
pronounced" in a few regions such as California, Florida, Arizona,
and Nevada, where house prices more than doubled just between
2000 and 2006.48 Yet, even given these skyward statistics, the
housing market in the United States was not the most overheated.
In the same period - "between 1997 and 2006 - prices in Great
Britain went up by 194%, those in Spain by 180%, and those in
Ireland by 253%. ,,49
D. The Rise of Subprime Lending - The Essentials
What was peculiar to the United States was the sudden rise
of "subprime" lending. Today's home mortgage market is
divisible into "prime" and "subprime" segments. The prime
segment generally caters to the most creditworthy borrowers.
Subprime lending, on the other hand, is geared towards a greater
number of higher-risk borrowers who do not qualify for market
interest rates owing to various risk factors, such as income level,
size of the down payment made, credit history, and employment
status. 0 The genesis of subprime lending can be traced to several
46. Dustin Fisher, Comment, Selling the Payments: Predatory Lending Goes
Primetime, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 587, 592 (2008) ((citing Robert J. Shiller,
Irrational Exuberance 3 (2d ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (2001) (noting that
housing appreciation has been a "rocket taking off," as only the post-World War II
boom can compare with the home appreciation of [fifty-two] percent witnessed
between 1997 and 2004)).
47. CSI: credit crunch, supra note 25.
48. See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on
U.S. Housing Market before FDIC's Forum on Mortgage Lending to Low and
Moderate Income Households, Washington, D.C. (July 8, 2008), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpl07O.htm.
49. CSI: credit crunch, supra note 19.
50. See Kenneth C. Johnston, James B. Greer, Julie K. Biermacher & Joseph
Hummel, The Subprime Morass: Past, Present, and Future, 12 N.C. BANKING INST.
125, 125 (2008) (citing Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc., 471 F.3d 977, 984
(9th Cir. 2006); Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Advanta Corp., No. Civ.A.01-
507 KAJ, 2005WL2234608, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 8, 2005)); see also Mortgage Market
Turmoil: Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearing 2] (testimony of Roger T.
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key federal laws enacted during recent decades. In 1980, Congress
enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
52Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA),51 which preempted state usury
ceilings for the majority of home mortgage loans.53 Enacted during
a period of record-high interest rates, in part to foster lending to
borrowers in states with low usury ceilings, DIDMCA's
deregulatory principles both condoned increased conventional
mortgage interest rates in states with low usury ceilings and
encouraged the growth of the subprime market by overriding
limits on high interest rate mortgage loans." Furthermore, in 1982,
Congress enacted the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act of 1982 (AMTPA),55 which spurred increased flexibility in the
mortgage lending industry by allowing lenders to offer adjustable
rate mortgages as part of their business transactions.
The subprime mortgage loan is a fairly recent "product
niche in the mortgage lending industry" that achieved prominence
as a financing vehicle during the course of the past decade.56 While
the housing market was still robust, lenders argued that innovative
and exotic lending vehicles would widen consumer access to credit,
which did in fact occur. 7 As the mortgage industry also underwent
substantial changes, aggressive lenders sprung up to serve
Cole, Dir., Div. of Banking Supervision and Regulation) (noting that the term
"subprime borrower" refers to those "who do not qualify for prime interest rates
because they exhibit one or more of the following characteristics: weakened credit
histories typically characterized by payment delinquencies, previous charge-offs,
judgments or bankruptcies; low credit scores; high debt-burden ratios; or high loan-
to-value rations").
51. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 84 Stat. 132 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also
Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 127.
52. Usury regulation refers to the amount of interest a lender may charge a
borrower. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 344 (3d ed. 2008).
53. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 127 (citing Souphala Chomsisengphet &
Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 31, 34 & 38 (2006)).
54. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 127 (citing Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth
Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers
and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167,174-75 (2007)).
55. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-06
(2006).
56. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 125.
57. Carrillo, supra note 35, at 3.
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subprime borrowers; Countrywide, for instance, established a
subprime unit in 1996.58 Banks and other lenders funded these
loans with little regard for the borrower's credit history.
"Underwriting standards for mortgages weakened as more and
more reliance was placed on the value of the collateral (the home)
rather than the willingness and ability of the borrower to repay the
loan out of income."5 9 Easy credit, coupled with the assumption
that housing prices would continue to appreciate, created an
increase in homeownership rates and the demand for housing
while encouraging many subprime borrowers to obtain adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs) which they could not afford after the
initial incentive period when the mortgage interest rate reset to a
higher, market-based rate.6° The majority of subprime loans are
ARMs. 6' For home buyers who do not intend to stay in their
homes for long, these lending mechanisms can cost a lot less than a
thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage, at least in the early part of the
loan's term. Many of these loans, including interest-only or
"option" ARMs, also permitted borrowers to pay only the interest
portion of the debt, or even less than that. According to an
estimate, more than $2 trillion in ARMs were originated from 2004
to 2006.62 All types of ARMs present the substantial risk that
interest rate increases will result in a significantly higher monthly
63
mortgage payment. In addition, due to the increased risks
associated with making subprime loans, the costs of a subprime
loan are higher than that of a traditional loan. 64 The average
58. Streitfeld & Morgenson, supra note 42.
59. Neel Kashkari, Interim Assistant Sec'y of the Treasury for Fin. Stability,
Review of the Financial Market Crisis and the Troubled Assets Relief Program at
Georgetown University (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/rel
eases/hp1349.htm.
60. CSI: credit crunch, supra note 25.
61. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 126 (citing FED. RES. BD. CONSUMER
HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES (2007), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/arms/arms.english.htm).
62. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 127 (citing Alistair Barr, 'Tsunami' of
Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Resets Coming, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 23, 2007, http:/
www.marketwatch.com/news/story/mortgage-reset-tsunami-could-end/story.aspx?
guid=%7BECEE333A-22A2-4ECD-8C69-5ED431990A9E%7D).
63. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 126 (citing FED. RES. BD. CONSUMER
HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES (2007), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/arms/arms-english.htm).
64. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
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interest rate of a fixed-rate subprime mortgage loan at origination
was more than two percent greater than the rate of traditional
loans at origination between 1995 and 2004.65 Subprime mortgage
origination volume increased from less than five percent, or $35
billion, of total mortgage origination volume in 1994 to nearly
66twenty percent, or $625 billion, in 2005. In the past, the United
States has never had a mortgage-backed market where such a
sizeable portion of the lending product is subprime or has
potential credit problems.6' Given the gravity and sheer size of
these lending statistics, a substantial impact would almost certainly
result if something were to go wrong.
We continue to see on a daily basis the dramatic impact of
subprime loans on homeowners and communities, "with five
million homeowners now delinquent or in foreclosure. 68 More
then a million homes have been lost to foreclosure in the last two
years, and according to data from the Mortgage Bankers
Association, lenders were in the process of initiating 2.25million
foreclosures in 2008, a substantial increase over the annual average
of one million during the pre-crisis period. It is also estimated
that banks made fifteen million questionable mortgage loans from
2004 to 2007 and that ultimately ten million of those will default.70
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2057-60 (2007) (finding
that lenders charge subprime borrowers higher interest rates and fees while adding
onerous loan terms, such as prepayment penalties); see also Brescia, supra note 38, at
287; R. Stephen Painter Jr., Subprime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy: A Proposal
to Amend §§522(f)(1)(B) and 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to Protect
Subprime Mortgage Borrowers and Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
81, 87 (2006).
65. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 126 (citing Souphala Chomsisengphet &
Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 31, 34 (2006)).
66. See The Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating
Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong.
(2007) [hereinafter Hearing 3] (testimony of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury).
67. Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow Riskier, and Investors Are Attracted, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com2006/09/06/business/06place.html.
68. Paulson, supra note 34.
69. Bernanke, supra note 37; see also Julie Scelfo, After the House Is Gone, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/garden/23foreclosure.html.
70. Jon Hilsenrath, Joanna Slater & Justin Lahart, Few Good Scenarios in View
as Crisis Spreads, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1222
40008411278257.html.
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These defaults are not only causing reduced home prices because
homes in foreclosure sell for less and bring down the value of
other homes in the neighborhood and surrounding proximity, but
they have also led mortgage lending institutions to stiffen their
lending standards, "contributing to more defaults, in a downward
spiral."71
To illustrate these imprudent lending and borrowing
practices, take two distinct scenarios in Minnesota and California.
At the age of twenty-one, Irene Thomas of North Minneapolis,
Minnesota obtained ten residential properties within a ninety-day
period with no money down, after she was convinced that she
could become wealthy through real estate acquisitions.72 After
incurring some $2.4 million in mortgage debt for these home
purchases, Ms. Thomas failed to make the mortgage payments,
and all of the properties were in foreclosure just over one year
later. Now, Ms. Thomas' credit is ruined.74 On the West Coast, a
non-English speaking Mexican strawberry picker in Bakersfield,
California who earned $14,000 "was lent every penny he needed to
purchase a house for $720,000.""5 While shocking, these scenarios
remain far too typical of the subprime mortgage quagmire and the
breakdown of responsibility at every link in our financial system.
Among other egregious conduct that led us here, recent
news raises the question whether banks and other private
mortgage originators of subprime and other "nonprime" loans
were overly aggressive in their lending practices as a means to
deliberately profit or attempt to profit - in economic benefit or
even fraudulent gain - through reducing the amount of information
they collected from borrowers. It seems that these mortgage
originators were turning a blind eye to increase mortgage
origination volume in order to feed the voracious appetite for
71. Id.
72. See Cox, supra note 44, at 685 (citing Pam Louwagie & Glenn Howatt, "Straw
Buyer" Deals Fuel Tidal Wave of Foreclosures, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 10,
2007, at Al).
73. Id..
74. See id.
75. Thomas L. Friedman, OP-ED, All Fall Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at
A33 (quoting Michael Lewis, The End of Wall Street's Boom, PORTFOLIO, Dec. 2008,
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/1 /he-End-
of-Wall-Streets-Boom).
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mortgages of the investment bankers putting together the
mortgage securitizations. Some secondary market actors,
including Lehman Brothers,76 even facilitated abusive lending in
recent years. The Associated Press has also reported that a federal
grand jury is investigating subprime lenders Countrywide Financial
Corporation, New Century Financial Corporation and IndyMac
Bancorp Inc., and noted that the FBI is also investigating IndyMac
for possible fraud.77
E. The Politics of Homeownership
The advocacy and pursuit of homeownership as a social
policy under recent Democratic and Republican administrations
has also played an instrumental role in fueling the trend towards
issuing risky home loans. The Tax Reform Act of 198678
encouraged and fostered increased home lending as residential
mortgages became the sole consumer loans in which the interest
paid is tax deductible. Thanks to a provision of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 199779 that exempted most home sales from capital
gains tax, a benefit not available to earlier generations of
Americans, people were given greater incentive to plow even more
money into real estate. Dating back to the early 1990s, consumers
with less-than-stellar credit histories were able to gain increased
access to mortgage credit at interest rates above prime borrower
rates. Henry G. Cisneros, then secretary of Housing and Urban
Development in the mid-1990s under President Clinton, loosened
76. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 64, at 2040 n.6 (noting that in 2003, a federal
jury held Lehman Brothers liable, as an investment bank and provider of a
warehouse line of credit to First Alliance Mortgage Corp. (FAMCO), a subprime
lender, for aiding and abetting FAMCO's fraud on borrowers); Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2221-25 (2007)
(noting how Lehman's reputation suffered from its business dealings with mortgage
originators and servicers over the course of the past decade as it was indirectly
involved in predatory lending scandals in at least five separate episodes).
77. See Grand Jury Investigating SubPrime Lenders, CBS NEws, July 25, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/25/national/main4292140.shtml.
78. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
79. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
80. Under the law, the first $500,000 in gains from any home sale is exempt from
taxes for a married couple, and the first $250,000 in gains is exempt from taxes for
singles, as long as they had lived in the home for at least two of the previous five
years. Id.
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
mortgage restrictions so that first-time buyers could qualify for
loans they could not get before.8' At the core of the Clinton
administration's National Homeownership Strategy, which
promoted homeownership as both patriotic and an easy win for all,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
alleviated many mortgage anxieties for first-time home buyers. By
insuring billions of dollars in loans, changing existing regulations
so that families no longer had to prove that their incomes would
remain stable for five years, allowing lenders to hire their own
appraisers, which often resulted in inflated house valuations, and
no longer requiring lenders to interview most government-insured
borrowers in person or maintain physical branch offices, HUD
fueled the mortgage engine.82 The Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA),83 a Carter era program, was also used to encourage banks
to lend to mortgage customers formerly considered ineligible for
loans. In pursuit of a social goal-universal home ownership-
banks either lowered credit standards and granted mortgages or
faced fines and business penalties for Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) 4 or Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)85
violations. Gene Sperling, who served as national economic
adviser to President Clinton, notes that enforcement under the
CRA during the 1990s was strong and prime lending to low-
income communities increased while it was done safely in order to
minimize risk.86 Over the years, the Federal Reserve has prepared
two reports for the U.S. Congress with detailed information on the
performance of lending to lower-income borrowers or
neighborhoods-populations at the core of the CRA. The 2000
Federal Reserve report concluded that "lending under the act was
81. See Streitfeld & Morgenson, supra note 42.
82. See id.
83. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (2006).
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-06 (2006).
85. 15 U.S.C. 1691 etseq.(2006) (prohibiting creditors from discriminating against
credit applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, age, because an applicant receives income from a public assistance program,
or because an applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act).
86. See Michael S. Barr & Gene Sperling, Poor Homeowners, Good Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A23 (Barr serves as a professor of law at the University of
Michigan).
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generally profitable and not overly risky. These studies also
found that lending to lower-income individuals and communities
has been almost as profitable as other types of lending done by
CRA-covered institutions, suggesting that the CRA did not
encourage banks to procure loans that "perform out of line with
their traditional businesses., 8 But in 2003, President Bush's chief
thrift regulator announced his plans to cut banking regulations and
89his enforcement staff, which were carried out over two years.
Moreover, the CRA does not cover the majority of subprime
lending since many of the largest subprime lenders are not banks.90
According to recent Federal Reserve data, seventy-five percent of
the higher-priced mortgage loans rendered during the peak of the
subprime boom were proffered by independent mortgage firms
and bank affiliates-financial institutions that are not covered by
the CRA.91 Since the overwhelming proportion of subprime loans
were issued through non-banking entities that were therefore not
regulated as banks, a huge portion of the mortgage market was not
regulated to any significant extent. Such measures served as a
detriment to the work of countless local community banks that had
long histories of responsible lending to creditworthy low- and
moderate-income borrowers.
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
were for-profit, privately-owned mortgage finance companies
87. Id. See also Gov. Randall S. Kroszner, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve
Sys., The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis at the
Confronting Concentrated Poverty Policy Forum, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner2008l203a.
htm (noting that while some argue that "by encouraging banking institutions to help
meet the credit needs of lower-income borrowers and areas," the CRA law "pushed
banking institutions to undertake high-risk mortgage lending," the Federal Reserve
has "not yet seen empirical evidence to support these claims, nor has it been our
experience in implementing the law over the past 30 years that the CRA has
contributed to the erosion of safe and sound lending practices").
88. Kroszner, supra note 87.
89. See Barr & Sperling, supra note 86.
90. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.,
The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges, Speech at the
Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 30, 2007),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2007330
a.htm (noting that fully two-thirds of subprime mortgages are beyond the scope of
the CRA).
91. See Barr & Sperling, supra note 86.
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whose shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange and were
two of the largest companies in the United States as measured by
assets until they were placed into government receivership in
12September 2008. Congress established Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to facilitate a liquid national market for residential mortgages
as a means to foster homeownership.93  These government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which have generally held title to
or guaranteed about half of the residential mortgages in the
United States, operate in the secondary mortgage market by
providing credit guarantees on mortgage-backed securities or
directly investing in mortgages and mortgage-related securities
through their retained mortgage portfolios. As of mid-November
2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed almost
thirty-one million mortgages, about fifty-eight percent of all single
family mortgages. 94
In 1995, Fannie Mae and the Freddie Mac began receiving
affordable housing credit from HUD for purchasing mortgage-
backed securities, which included loans to low-income borrowers.95
Since low-income Americans are more likely to live in rental
housing than in owner-occupied housing, affordable housing credit
provides tax incentives for the utilization of private equity
investment in the development of affordable housing aimed at
low-income Americans. This policy allowed Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to include billions of dollars that they invested in
subprime loans to serve as a public good that would promote
affordable housing. By expanding the type of loans that they
purchased, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae hoped to encourage
banks, thrift institutions, and mortgage companies to make more
loans to people with questionable credit ratings.
Moreover, in July 1999, HUD proposed that by the year
2001, fifty percent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's portfolios be
92. See David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019,
1022 (2008).
93. See id. at 1022-23.
94. See Statement of Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency Dir. James B. Lockhart, Nov. 11,
2008, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/GetFile.aspx?FilelD=169.
95. See Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH.
POST, June 10, 2008, at Al.
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96
composed of loans to low and moderate-income borrowers. In
1998, forty-four percent of the loans Fannie Mae purchased were
from these groups.97 In 2005, HUD increased the target share of
their mortgages that had to go to low- and moderate-income
buyers to fifty-two percent.9s This action, designed to encourage
those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit
was generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans,
condoned the practice of subprime mortgage lending.99 Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae also faced increasing pressure from the
Clinton administration to expand mortgage loans among low and
moderate-income people and felt pressure from stockholders to
maintain their phenomenal growth in profits. As a result,
subprime mortgage loan originations surged by twenty-five
percent per year between 1994 and 2003, resulting in a nearly ten-
fold increase in the volume of these loans in just nine years.0" The
banks and loan companies then used the cash obtained from
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to originate more mortgages. This
constant cash flow kept the housing bubble inflated.
But as far back as 1999, a sentiment existed that in moving
into this new area of lending, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were
taking on a significant amount of risk.'0 2 While such actions might
not pose any difficulties during flush economic times, the fact that
some red flags were waved then signaled the potential for trouble
in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar
to that which occurred for the savings and loan industry in the
1980s. 3 Despite these signals of skepticism and caution, the Bush
administration continued and enhanced the Clinton
administration's efforts to amplify homeownership as it promoted
96. Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CODE7DB1
53EF933A0575ACOA96F958260.
97. See id.
98. See HUD Housing Goals, 24 C.F.R. § 81.12 (2004).
99. See Holmes, supra note 96.
100. See id.
101. See U.S. Home Prices: Does Bust Always Follow Boom?, FDIC, (Feb. 10,
2005 (revised Apr. 8, 2005)), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2005/021005fyi.
html.
102. See Holmes, supra note 96.
103. See id.
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an "Ownership Society"-emphasizing that the United States
would be a "stronger country every single time a family moves into
a home of their own."' 4 President George W. Bush's promotion of
expanded homeownership was aided by the American Dream
Downpayment Act of 2003,05 which authorized subsidies to 40,000
low-income households per year to cover down payments and
closing costs. To accomplish this homeownership objective,
President Bush advocated new policies encouraging
homeownership, like the "zero-down-payment initiative," and, just
in 2007 alone, twenty-nine percent of mortgages were originated
with no down payment. 10 6  More exotic mortgages followed,
including ones only requiring the payment of interest for the first
two years of the mortgage loan term or option ARMs where the
borrower chooses how much he or she wants to pay.10 7 In both
cases, the outcome might very well be negative amortization, since
none or not all of the principal is being repaid. Some of those
mortgages went to speculators; others to responsible borrowers
who were able to buy a home because of expanded access to
credit. "From people dizzily drawing home equity loans out of
increasingly valuable houses to banks racking up huge fees, few
wanted the party to end."'0 8
F. The Current Housing Crisis: Reverberating Effects of
Subprime Lending
The frightening aspect, however, is that what began as a
subprime lending problem has spread to other, less-risky
mortgages, and contributed to excess home inventories, defaults,
and foreclosures that have pushed down home prices for even the
most responsible borrowers and homeowners. 109  Many
104. Zachary Karabell, The End of the Ownership Society, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20,
2008, at 39.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12821 (2007).
106. See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on
Current Financial and Housing Markets at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/rel
eases/hp887.htm).
107. Karabell, supra note 104.
108. Streitfeld & Morgenson, supra note 42.
109. See Paulson, supra note 34.
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homeowners, unfortunately, did not necessarily do anything
wrong; they just bought a house near the peak of an unsustainable
bubble. An estimated 8.8 million homeowners - nearly 10.8% of
total homeowners - had zero or negative equity as of March 2008,
meaning that they are under water because their homes are worth
less than their mortgage. ° This provides them with an incentive
to turn their house keys into their lender and walk away from their
homes, despite the negative credit rating impact, because it is
difficult for borrowers in financial trouble to refinance or sell their
homes and pay off their mortgage if their debt exceeds their
home's value."1  Foreclosures are painful and costly events that
destroy real estate values and force fire sales of homes - lowering
the value of other homes in their neighborhoods and surrounding
areas. First American CoreLogic, a real estate data company, has
calculated that 7.6 million properties in the country were under
water as of September 30, 2008, while another 2.1 million were in
striking distance. 2  That is nearly a quarter of all homes with
mortgages."3 The result of homeowners being under water adds to
negative market psychology and puts more pressure on an
economy that is already in a substantial recession."' No longer
having equity in their homes, people are less inclined to shop at
the mall and are unable to finance large consumer purchases such
as automobiles or vacations from home equity loans. Reduced
consumer spending lessens corporate profits, and contributes to
additional layoffs and more mortgage defaults and foreclosures,
continuing a worsening downward cycle and feedback chain.
110. See Edmund L. Andrews & Louis Uchitelle, Rescues for Homeowners in Debt
Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22homes.
html.
111. See James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Housing Pain Gauge: Nearly 1 in 6
Owners 'Under Water,' WALL ST. J., Oct. 8,2008, at A5.
112. See David Streitfeld, A Town Drowns in Debt as Home Values Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/business/11home.html?
_r=l&hp&oref=slogin.
113. See id.
114. See Hagerty & Simon, supra note 111.
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
III. FINANCIAL INNOVATION: THE GROWTH OF COMPLEX
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS ON WALL STREET
A. Funding of Subprime Mortgage Loans Through
Securitization
This financial crisis has been with us since July 2007. As
subsequent events have demonstrated, the problem was much
broader than subprime lending. The factor that levered a serious
housing market bubble and collapse into a threat to the United
States financial markets and, indeed, the world financial system,
was the financial innovations that developed on Wall Street as a
result of securitization. The transfer and diffusion of risk was
supposed to be the great advance brought to the world by financial
engineering and innovation. Traditionally, banks managed loans
"from cradle to grave" as they made mortgage loans and retained
the risk of default, called credit risk, and profited only as they were
paid back.'15 Lenders evaluated borrowers carefully because the
lenders held the mortgages for the life of the loan and thereby
carried the incentive to ensure responsible lending practices."' As
a result of financial innovation, however, banks do not expect
repayment themselves, but can now sell the rights to the mortgage
payments and the related credit risk to investors through a process
called securitization by which individual mortgage loans are
transformed into tradeable securities. Simply put, the originate-
to-distribute model, as opposed to the originate-to-hold model, is
an innovative process that allows banks to expand their lending
business by originating more loans while facilitating income
streams for the capital markets.
18
Securitization, a close cousin of secured lending, is a
structured finance process in which assets, receivables or financial
instruments are acquired, classified into pools, and offered as
115. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 64, at 2049.
116. See id. at 2050.
117. See Brescia, supra note 38, at 282 (noting that the securitization of subprime
mortgage loans contributed to the subprime market expansion by converting future
income streams into immediate and liquid funds, which were then used to fund more
home mortgage loans).
118. See Peterson, supra note 76, at 2187-88.
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collateral for third-party investment. 19 This method of financial
engineering, a critical means of capital formation, wedded the
mortgage industry with the capital markets. Since a liquid
secondary market for individual mortgage loans does not exist,
investment banks, instead, take pools of mortgage loans, split the
cash flows from those receivables, and use the cash flows to make
payments to bondholders, who are secured by the mortgages. As
securitization became increasingly popular in recent years, home
finance became more focused on feeding the appetites of national
and global investors instead of assisting home buyers in their
112
choice of an appropriate loan. The process, while complex, is
made simpler by its cyclical nature. Originating lenders in the
primary mortgage market sell mortgages to secondary mortgage
market firms, which then sell securities or bonds collateralized by
the value of mortgage loans. The secondary mortgage market
firms then sell those securities backed by the mortgages that they
purchased to investors and use the resulting proceeds to purchase
more mortgages from primary market lenders. Simply stated,
securitization entails pooling and restructuring a group of assets
into a package, which is then offered to investors in the form of a
security.
Securitization is an avenue to disperse risk amongst a wide
group of investors and decrease risk exposures of financial
• ... . 123
institutions. The originating lender "securitized" the loan by
transferring it into a pool with other mortgage loans. The bankers
that assembled the pool of mortgages then sold financial
instruments backed by that pool to investors. Later, those bankers
also made derivative bets based on the same mortgage pool. At
119. Wall Street has expanded its securitization structures beyond home mortgage
loans to include credit card debt, automobile loans, commercial loans, equipment
leases, and loans to developing nations. Moreover, receivables from essentially the
entirety of income-producing assets can be securitized, including oil exploration,
physician and hospital accounts, business ventures, lawsuit settlement proceeds, and
even sports arenas. An illustration of the securitization of automobile loans can be
found in STEVEN L. SCHWARCz, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LISSA L. BROOME,
SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS (LexisNexus 2004).
120. See Engel &McCoy, supra note 64, at 2045.
121. See id.
122. See Carrillo, supra note 35, at 17.
123. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 79.
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the time the group of assets is bundled into a package, investment
bankers break the mortgage pool into a number of different parts,
referred to as "tranches" (French for "strips"). These tranches can
be structured in virtually any way the bankers structuring the
securitization see fit, allowing for the tailoring of a single asset
pool for a variety of risk tolerances. Each tranche has a different
level of credit protection or risk exposure than another: there is
generally a senior ("A") class of securities and one or more junior
subordinated ("B," "C," etc.) classes that function as protective
layers for the "A" class. Credit rating agencies, companies that
assign credit ratings for issuers of certain types of debt obligations
as well as the debt instruments themselves, typically gave the
senior securities AAA-rating, signifying a lower risk, while the
subordinated classes received lower credit ratings, signifying a
higher risk. In the event that the underlying asset pool becomes
insufficient to make payments on the securities, such as when loans
default within a portfolio of loan claims, the loss is absorbed first
by the subordinated tranches. The upper-level tranches remain
unaffected until the losses exceed the entire amount of the
subordinated tranches. Pension funds typically invested in the less
risky high-credit rated mortgage-backed securities, while hedge
funds sought higher returns by investing in those with low credit
ratings. While many were unaware, the risks that originating
mortgage lenders took on under the old system had been
transferred to the securitization investors as lenders no longer
found it necessary to keep loans on their books, but could sell
pools of them to banks and investment funds at home or abroad.
The popularity of securitization surged when investors fled
the stock market seeking safer and more predictable returns
following the dot-com bubble collapse during 2000 and 2001, the
scandals surrounding the demise of Enron and MCI Worldcom,
and the stock manipulation by Wall Street firms famously
investigated by then-New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer. 124 Fixed-income products and mortgage-backed securities
were asset classes that were attractive to investors thanks to their
124. See Stuart R. Berkowitz, The Subprime Mortgage Mess - A Primer to Assist
Investors, 64 J. Mo. B. 122, 122 (2008).
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alleged safety, security, and predictability.12 Asset securitization
emerged as a primary means of capital formation and attracted
trillions of dollars in investments. Voracious investor demand
exhausted the supply of prime mortgage loan securitizations and
investment bankers began seeking subprime mortgage loans to
continue to generate mortgage-backed securities. In recent years,
the vast majority of subprime mortgage loans have been
securitized; by 2007, lenders had securitized almost eighty percent
of such mortgages. 126  According to former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, "[w]ithout the excess demand from
securitizers, subprime mortgage originations would have been far
smaller and defaults accordingly far fewer."'
127
A major incentive for investing in securitized instruments
was that investors received higher rates of return for such financial
instruments than for more secure investments like Treasury bonds,
in exchange for the assumption of risk for any defaults on the
underlying assets.1 28 As noted above, the Federal Reserve, in the
aftermath of the dot-coin boom's implosion, cut the federal funds
rate from 6.5% to 3.5% in just a few months, and reached 1.0% by
2003. The Federal Reserve did not commence raising rates again
until mid-2004, and the base inflation-adjusted short-term interest
rate was negative for thirty-one consecutive months. 129  Low
interest rates set by the Federal Reserve, as a result, led to low
returns on traditionally safe U.S. Treasury bonds. Therefore,
securitized investments, which yielded a premium but many of
which carried AAA-ratings even if the underlying mortgages were
dubious, were quite attractive to domestic and foreign investors.30
125. See id.
126. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 64, at 2040, 2045 (noting that in 2005, total
securitizations of subprime and home equity loans equaled a whopping $525.7
billion) (citing Standard & Poor's (S&P), Rating Transitions 2005; U.S. RMBS
Volume and Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, tbl.1 (Jan. 24, 2006)).
127. Role of Federal Regulators in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H.R.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing 4]
(testimony of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed.
Reserve Sys.).
128. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 79-80.
129. See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 59
(PublicAffairs 2008).
130. See Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the
Duty to Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1514-16 (2008); Unterman, supra note 44, at
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As mortgages were pooled together, investors relied on credit
rating agencies to assess the underlying securities, given them a
reasonably reliable prediction of expected returns without them
needing to spend the time and energy evaluating each individual
mortgage loan originator and each mortgage loan on their own."'
As the housing market started to cool in 2006 and Treasury yields
fell further, more and more fixed-income investors sought
mortgage-backed securities, allowing these instruments with their
relatively high yields to outperform many other fixed-income
instruments.
B. Mortgage-Backed Securities
Mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) are asset-backed
securities whose cash flows are backed by the principal and
interest payments from a pool of mortgage loans. This financial
instrument became the routine method for financing the common
mortgage loan. While their structures vary, their primary purpose
is to transfer both the right to receive "the cash flow from pools of
mortgage loans" and the associated default risks to third-party
• , 132
investors. In the case of fixed-rate mortgage loans, MBSs also
transfer the risk of interest rate fluctuations to investors. While all
investors in securities receive their pro rata share of principal and
interest collections from the prior month, MBSs are also
commonly known as "pass-through" certificates because the
principal and interest of the underlying loans is "passed through"
to investors. In this set-up, mortgage loans are pooled into a trust
79-81 (noting the confidence that certain types of securitized assets containing
mortgages, such as MBSs, "were of low risk and therefore suitable alternatives to
investment in government treasury bonds"); see also PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN
OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 150 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2009)
(noting that many investors who typically only purchase AAA-rated securities were
more than happy to purchase AAA-rated securitized assets that yielded higher
returns than ordinary bonds) (Krugman, a winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in
Economics, teaches economics and international affairs at Princeton University);
Morris, supra note 123, at 76 (noting that negative real American interest rates
encouraged American investors to seek greater yields, while Japanese rates were
even lower, which led foreign investors to invest in "risky American instruments").
131. See Peterson, supra note 76, at 2213.
132. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 128 (citing U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Mortgage-Backed Securities (June 25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgage
securities.htm).
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by a mortgage loan originator, which then sells interests in the
trust to certain investors-certificateholders"' The trust then
passes through principal and interest payments, minus certain
servicing and guaranty fees, to the investors on a pro rata basis.
If any loan in the pool is prepaid, the investor receives the
principal amount of that loan, and then could seek alternative
investment opportunities for that portion of his or her initial
investment.1
35
There are many reasons for mortgage originators to finance
their activities by issuing mortgage-backed securities. Primarily,
mortgage-backed securities transform relatively illiquid financial
assets into liquid and tradable capital market instruments, allow
mortgage originators to replenish their funds to originate more
loans, and allow issuers to remove assets from their balance sheets.
Mortgage-backed securities had been very attractive to investors
because they paid more than Treasury bonds, garnered high
ratings from credit rating agencies, and had proved only somewhat
more risky - at least until the current financial crisis. Moreover,
since real estate has traditionally been and remains one of the
largest sources of global wealth, they came to represent an almost
unlimited investment market. 6 For a company seeking to raise
capital, it made sense for it to turn a pool of assets with projected
long-term interest streams, like mortgages, into ready cash
immediately.'37 For certain individual and institutional investors,
with particular risk preferences, this type of security often proved
very appealing. The securitization process allows for the creation
of securities that match investor preferences for particular types of
risk, which broadened the availability of capital to both lenders
and homeowners.
133. See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities (June 25,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 92.
137. See Hauser, supra note 130, at 1512.
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C. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
In addition, collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs)
are bonds that represent claims to particular cash flows from large
asset bundles of home mortgages. While another pool of mortgage
loans, they differ from mortgage-backed securities by their
118issuance of different classes or tranches of securities. These
securities are divided into various tranches that receive credit
ratings from the credit rating agencies. These ratings ranged from
senior tranches (rated AAA), mezzanine tranches (AA to BB), to
equity tranches (unrated). The cash flows of principal and interest
payments from each tranche are paid out by order of priority in a
predetermined order, with the most risky tranches receiving
payment last but benefiting from the highest interest rates. 39 Each
tranche typically has different principal balances, coupon rates,
prepayment risks, and maturity dates.4
D. Collateralized Debt Obligations
Further expanding the potential investor base was the
development of another structured product, collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), 141 which are used to purchase asset-backed
instruments, such as MBSs or CMOs with various ratings and
projected returns. CDOs, an unregulated type of asset-backed
138. See Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 129 (citing U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (June 25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/
tcmos.htm).
139. See Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 129 (citing Sec. Indus. And Fin. Markets
Ass'n, Types of Bonds: The Effect of Interest Rates on CMO Values and
Prepayment Rates, http://www.investingbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=5&subcat
id=17&id=33 (last visited Jan. 16, 2009); Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass'n, Types of
Bonds: Minimum Investments, Transaction Costs, and Liquidity, http://www.
investingbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=5&subcatid=17&id=36 (last visited Jan. 16,
2009)); Broome & Markham, supra note 52, at 323; see generally Banca Cremi, S.A.
v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining the structure
and use of CMOs).
140. See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (June
25, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm.
141. See John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants
Need for Direct Regulatory Intervention--A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?,
55 BUFF. L. REV. 1371, 1386 (2008). A collateralized debt obligation (CDO), may be
called a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) or a collateralized bond obligation
(CBO) if it holds only loans or bonds, respectively.
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security and structured credit product, are constructed from a
portfolio of hundreds or thousands of fixed-income assets, such as
actual loans or bonds. CDO securities are arranged by investment
banker/securitizer into various tranches with input from the credit
rating agencies. The securities pooled are typically those
otherwise receiving the lowest rating by the credit rating
142
agencies. Losses are applied in reverse order of seniority and
junior tranches offer higher interest rates to compensate for the
increased default risk. Usually sold with default insurance, these
CDO securities had one major flaw-their balance sheet value was
assessed not by the value of the underlying income streams but by
their sale price in the secondary market. If there were no
market-no one willing to buy these securities-the theoretical
book value fell to zero.
Since 1987, CDOs have become an important and pivotal
funding vehicle for fixed-income assets. The needle through which
much of the air inflating the housing bubble passed was the asset-
backed CDO fashioned by Wall Street's leading investment houses
and banks. Mortgage-backed CDOs, nearly forty percent of the
entire $500 billion CDO market in 2006, have been one of the
major purchasers of MBSs, in particular the lower-rated
tranches.'43 In 2005, firms issued $178 billion in mortgage and
other asset-backed CDOs compared with just $4 billion worth of
CDOs that used safer, high-grade corporate bonds as collateral.
14
In 2006, issuance of mortgage and asset-backed CDOs amounted
to $316 billion, compared with $40 billion backed by corporate
bonds.1 45  Firms underwriting the CDOs generated fees of 0.4
percent to 2.5 percent of the amount sold; the fees generated on
the $316 billion worth of mortgage- and asset-backed CDOs issued
solely in 2006 would have ranged between $1.3 billion and $8
billion.146 By 2005, the amount of CDOs holding opaque and risky
142. See Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 129 (citing Bethany McLean, The
Dangers of Investing in Subprime Debt, FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 2007, http://money.cnn.
com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2007/04/02/8403416/index.htm).
143. See Hearing 3, supra note 66 (testimony of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury).
144. See Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at BUL.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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mortgage assets far exceeded CDOs composed of blue-chip
corporate loans.'47
Combining different types and grades of debt in one pool,
these complex securities were designed to reduce the risk of the
whole below the level of the individual pieces. But as very
complex instruments, even the most sophisticated investors
sometimes fail to appreciate their risks and substitute the rating
supplied by the credit rating agency for the investors' own
independent risk analysis.148  The complexity of CDOs often
rendered them opaque even to the credit rating agencies, making
the ratings suspect. Unfortunately, some institutions buying
CDOs lacked the competency to monitor credit performance or
estimate expected cash flows. Typically, the credit rating agencies
gave a majority of the securities issued an investment grade rating,
despite the fact that the pool backing the securities fell below
investment grade, because they believed that any losses from the
pool would be sufficiently covered by the investors in the lowest
tranches. 4 1 Subsequently, a major loss of confidence occurred in
the validity of the process used by credit rating agencies to assign
credit ratings to CDO tranches and other mortgage-related
investments.
E. Derivatives and Credit-Default Swaps
Derivatives, such as stock futures, are financial instruments
that can be used to limit risk; their value is "derived" from
underlying assets like mortgages, stocks, bonds, or commodities.
Financial derivatives are particular contracts that have no value by
themselves, but, rather, receive their value from movements in
interest rates, the outcome of specific events, or the price of
underlying assets like debt or equities."O An alternative means to
147. See id.
148. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 81.
149. See Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 129 (citing Bethany McLean, The
Dangers of Investing in Subprime Debt, FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 2007, http://money.cnn.
com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/4/2/8403416/index.htm).
150. See Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81
AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 408 (2007) (citing FRANKLIN ALLEN, RICHARD A. BREALEY, &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 727 (8th ed. 2006)).
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look at derivatives is as "a form of price guarantee: an agreement
between a future buyer and a future seller for something at some
designated point in time."'51 They operate by allowing investors to
place bets on the direction they believe financial markets will
move, without ever needing to own tangible assets.'52 A "credit
derivative" is a contract where one party's obligation to pay is
conditioned on the occurrence of a credit event, such as a default,
on another contract. Mortgage-related derivatives are among the
more complex derivatives, "involving a cornucopia of exotic,
jumbo-size contracts ultimately linked to real-world loans and
debts.""'
Credit-default swaps, a type of derivative invented by Wall
Street in the late 1990s, are contractual instruments intended to
insure against losses to banks and bondholders when a particular
bond or security goes into default-that is, when the stream of
revenue behind the loan becomes insufficient to meet the
payments that were promised. Essentially, credit-default swaps
(CDSs) are quasi-insurance policies on debt instruments acquired
by investors, including bonds, bond indexes, and securitizations, to
guard against credit losses from default.'54 The simplest credit-
default swap is a contract between two parties in which the seller
protects against negative credit events in exchange for payment of
a premium.'55 The primary purpose of CDSs is to make it easier
for banks to sell complex debt securities to investors, who use the
CDSs as a hedge against potential losses if borrowers are unable to
repay the loans.156 Derivatives like CDSs have been routinely
paired with or included in securitized assets in order to hedge, or
insure against, a negative credit event.'57 Credit derivatives, and
151. Lynch, supra note 141, at 1373.
152. See id.
153. Morgenson, supra note 144.
154. See Engel et al., supra note 64, at 2063; see also Jongho Kim, Ph.D., From
Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the Interpretation of
Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 729-30 (2008); Lynch, supra note
141, at 1381-85; Lubben, supra note 150, at 411.
155. See Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of
Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 3097 (2008);
Unterman, supra note 44, at 90.
156. See Engel et al., supra note 64, at 2063.
157. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 89.
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CDSs in particular, depend on the cash flow and performance of
the agreement reached between the parties based on a specified
credit risk related occurrence, such as a "failure to pay" principal
or interest, "bankruptcy" of the borrower, "work-out" or
"restructuring," and changes in credit rating."' As of late 2008,
there remained $55 trillion in credit-default swaps outstanding, an
amount more than the gross domestic product of all the world
nations combined. 
59
Despite its enormous size, the credit-default swaps market
has essentially operated in secrecy, with neither public disclosure
nor any legal requirement for these contracts to be reported to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or any other
agency. In 2000, Congress specifically chose not to regulate credit-
default swaps,"6 as the consensus was that the market was still very
small and no systemic risk would exist since investors' inclinations
to minimize their risks would protect the broader financial
system.16  Credit-default swaps were allowed to grow with no
required reserves and no regulatory supervision to assure that
sellers could meet their obligations. This means that government
regulators lacked any means to assess the amount of risk in the
system, and whether honest trades and accurate valuations have
been conducted. To value credit-default swaps and the mortgage-
related securities they insure, buyers and sellers of swaps relied too
heavily on financial models that could not predict the mortgage
market meltdown, and placed too much trust in the credit ratings
of the securities and of the financial firms selling the swaps. These
ratings substantially underestimated the risk involved. 62 In other
words, the underlying sentiment was why worry about the
possibility of loan defaults if credit-default swaps were available.
158. See Kim, supra note 154, at 755.
159. See Christopher Cox, Op-Ed., Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at WK13.
160. In 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A0365 (codified in various sections of
7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.), which provided that "swap agreements," including credit
default swaps, are not securities under the federal securities laws. See Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2000); Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 303(a)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1)).
161. See Cox, supra note 159.
162. See id.
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As a sign of other reform efforts to come, in mid-November 2008,
then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox executed, on behalf of the
SEC, a Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal Reserve
Board and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
dealing with central counterparties for over-the-counter credit
default swaps.'63 Cox also made repeated efforts to urge Congress
to enact legislation that would bring disclosure and transparency to
the complex and opaque CDS market.
F. Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations and Merrill Lynch
- A Case Study
To complicate the picture even further, some financial
firms such as Merrill Lynch engaged in synthetic collateralized
debt obligations-a conglomerate of CDOs and CDSs-and
another exemplar of a derivative. T6 Unlike regular CDOs which
contains loans or bonds, synthetics have been very attractive on
Wall Street because they use a computer-generated group of
CDOs or CDSs which can be packaged much more quickly and
generate larger fees, in part because the technology has not
become standardized. By 2002, when low interest rates pushed
investors to seek higher returns, investors said, "I don't want to be
in equities anymore and I'm not getting any return in my bond
positions," according to William T. Winters, co-chief executive of
JPMorgan's investment bank and a member of the JPMorgan team
that invented the first synthetic in 1997.165 As a result, they sought
116increased amounts of leverage and riskier asset classes. Inside
even more abstract synthetic CDOs, the risk was harder to parse
and much easier to overlook. These products allowed low-quality
mortgage assets to be passed off as higher-quality goods, giving
163. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Chairman Cox
Statement on MOU With Federal Reserve, CFTC To Address Credit Default Swaps
(Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-269.htm.
164. See generally Kim, supra note 154, at 739-41 (noting that a synthetic CDO
differs from the traditional cash CDO because the reference asset's credit risk shifts
to the investor, who, through securitization, benefits materially from the conversion
of reference assets into a cash equivalent asset).
165. Morgenson, supra note 144.
166. See id.
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banks and investors who traded them a false sense of security.161
Although CDO pioneers at JPMorgan saw their role as "financial
designers and intermediaries wary of the dangers of holding on to
their products too long" and only kept the highest-quality and
safest portions of their product in-house, Merrill brokers seemed
to bask in stockpiling increasingly risky CDOs to increase Merrill's
profit margin. By 2006, Merrill was the world's largest
underwriter of CDO products.169 But, by the end of 2005, Merrill
learned that A.I.G., the insurer it paid to insure its CDO stakes to
limit potential damage from defaults, had ceased insuring the
highest-quality portions of the firm's CDOs against default after
growing concerns about overly aggressive home lending.17 ° Yet,
even though it could not find a replacement insurer and therefore
was forced to bear the risk of default itself, Merrill remained both
unconcerned and unperturbed and, therefore, allowed its CDO
contagion to continue.
IV. THE "ORIGINATE-TO-DISTRIBUTE" SECURITIZATION MODEL
A. Securitization Created Many Incentives to Underestimate
Risk
The current financial crisis can be largely attributed to the
emergence of the complex "originate-to-distribute" banking model
where credit risk has been distributed broadly to investors,
meaning that each party in the product chain has not carried
certain responsibility or potential risk for every significant
financial product. The financial boom witnessed in the first half of
the 2000s decade will be remembered as an era where financial
engineering and innovation overwhelmed the capacity of both
regulators and financial institutions to assess risk. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the financial innovations which grew out of the
mortgages - derivatives built on other derivatives-were packaged
and repackaged until no one could identify what they contained
167. See id.
168. Id.; Susan Pulliam, Serena Ng & Randall Smith, Merrill Upped Ante as Boom
In Mortgage Bonds Fizzled, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at Al.
169. See Morgenson, supra note 144.
170. See id.; Pulliam et al., supra note 168.
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and how much they were worth. Expectations of continued
house price appreciation facilitated and supplemented the
mortgage securitization market, which grew increasingly complex
as the mortgage market changed from one local in nature to one
with global reach as international investors purchased packages of
mortgages for properties across the United States. While the
government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
had long operated by pooling mortgage loans into trusts, subject to
certain specified limitations on total loan value and eligibility,
"never before had those on Wall Street been invested so heavily in
securities backed by subprime loans., 17 2  During his tenure as
Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan opposed regulation of
the practices that allowed those subprime mortgages to be bundled
into larger securities and sold to investors, a policy and regulatory
approach he now concedes was somewhat misguided."3 The
absence of significant regulatory controls on how mortgages were
repackaged into larger and more complex securities served as a
central cause of the current financial crisis.7 4 Why take the time to
adequately assess and price risks if no one is looking?
These new and poorly understood instruments were
embraced by the financial world for their reputed safety and for
their high returns. Wall Street firms became enamored of the
profitability and supposed safety of their securitized credit
derivative instruments, not only originating many products but
also stocking their balance sheets with them as they had
represented a huge market with relatively high yields. Investment
banks promoted securitization, and MBSs in particular, "as the
answer to achieving high investment yields accompanied by low
risk levels." '75 Alan Greenspan has blamed the financial crisis on a
171. See Karabell, supra note 104.
172. Johnston et al., supra note 50, at 129-30.
173. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B1 (noting that Greenspan admitted that he
was "partially" wrong in his stance as one of the nation's leading voices for
deregulation).
174. See Engel et al., supra note 64, at 2040-41; see also Howard Schneider,
Greenspan: 'Crisis Broader Than Anything I Could Have Imagined, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/23/
AR2008102300193.html?hpid %3Dtopnews&sub=AR.
175. Unterman, supra note 44, at 88.
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heavy demand for securities backed by subprime mortgages by
investors who did not worry that the housing boom might come to
a crashing halt."' More fundamentally, "[i]t was the failure to
properly price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis,"
Greenspan said, by encouraging investors worldwide to look at
U.S. subprime loans as a "steal" rather than an uncertain bet that
relied on escalating home values.177
This insatiable appetite for risk permeated all sectors of the
financial services industry. For too long, the operating assumption
was that banks, operating in their own self-interest, would do what
was necessary to protect themselves and their shareholders. Since
lenders had incentives to "cherry pick" their loans and sell the
worst ones to investors, they had reduced motivation to
underwrite loans carefully.78  The assumption was that
sophisticated analysts at banks, investment firms, and hedge funds
would properly account for the risks involved, and price the
investments accordingly. Yet, the quality of their financial analysis
and, most importantly, the underlying risk assumptions, were
completely untested in a weak market. 7 9 Investment bankers
continued to package dubious mortgage loans into increasingly
opaque securities. While bankers are supposed to be highly skilled
at valuing assets, they were incentivized by their "sky-high"
bonuses before the credit crisis to attach lofty values to mortgage
securities, resulting in a poor analysis of the risks involved with
investing in home mortgages extended to less creditworthy
borrowers. 8° Pay was tied to profit, and profit to the easy,
borrowed money that could be invested in markets like mortgage-
backed securities. Given the perverse incentives of a "quick
payday" once the mortgage was transferred to another for sale as a
security, the broker and mortgage loan originator, both interested
in generating mortgage closing fees, were motivated to package as
many loans as possible, with little if any concern for the borrower's
176. See Aaron Smith, Greenspan: It's a 'Credit Tsunami,' CNNMONEY.COM, Oct.
23, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/l0/23/news/economy/committee-regulatory/ind
ex.htm?cnn=yes.
177. See Schneider, supra note 174.
178. See Engel et al., supra note 64, at 2048.
179. See Carrillo, supra note 35, at 3.
180. See Story & Dash, supra note 5.
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• 181likelihood of default under the mortgage loan. According to an
estimate, the New York-based securities firms earned $540 billion
by converting subprime loans into securities in the year 2006
alone."8 2 The whole incentive structure favored quantity over
quality, as securitization associates value with the number of
mortgages written, not the ability of borrowers to repay borrowed
funds. 83 As the former Citigroup chief executive Charles 0.
Prince III famously remarked, "[a]s long as the music is playing,
you've got to get up and dance."1 8
Yet, little did investors know that these investments were
not entirely safe and sound. For too long, the risk of these dubious
mortgages with high potential for default was disguised by the
financially engineered instruments that had repackaged the
questionable loans with higher quality debt, supposedly insuring
the whole against default. Securitizations led to a system where
the lender thought it need not care if mortgage loans were repaid.
As MBSs, CDOs, and other forms of bundled mortgages were
pooled nationwide, banks, investors, and credit rating agencies all
claimed that the risk of owning such packages was lessened
because of the broad diversity of loans contained in each pool.
Simply, "a few lemons couldn't drag down the value of the whole
package."" 5  Yet, a major problem with mortgage-backed
securities was the "Russian roulette" issue - the likelihood of a
"disastrous outcome appeared to be so low that it was ignored in
the models used by the issuers and raters, and the investors were
happy to rely on them., 186 Accordingly, even a low probability
event may signify an "unacceptable risk" - after all, few would
play Russian roulette, "even if the odds were wildly in our favor,
181. See Brescia, supra note 38, at 297.
182. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 96 (citing Christine Richard, Subprime
Losers Blame Bear, Credit Suisse, JPM, Morgan Stanley, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 11, 2007,
http://www.bloombergwealth.net/apps/news?pid=20602007&sid=avI34G5JBAjQ&ref
er=rates).
183. See Hauser, supra note 130, at 1505.
184. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 4, 2009, at p.
50.
185. Morgenson, supra note 144.
186. Floyd Norris, Proceed With Care, Mr. Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/business/07norris.html?_r=l&ref=business&oref
=slogin.
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because it is a game no one can lose twice. ' ' 187 And no one, least of
all financial regulators, could be sure who in the global financial
system was on the hook for which particular risks." In a recent
interview, Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), a member of the
Senate Banking and Finance Committees, remarked that until the
recent financial market distress, he himself did not fully appreciate
or recognize the amount of risk Wall Street had assumed and the
amount of harm its practices could inflict upon Americans.89 "It is
a learning process, no question about it, an evolution," he
commented, noting that he now believes that investors and
homeowners must benefit from increased scrutiny and better
safeguards. 9 °
Yet, the most important popular misconception relating to
mortgage-backed securities was the impression that the pooling of
mortgage loans inherently reduced risk through diversification. 9'
While high quality mortgages do, in fact, reduce risk, the credit
quality of subprime mortgage pools does not improve with the
mere addition of more subprime loans."' In other words, garbage
in equals garbage out. It should come as no surprise, then, that
securities composed of assets from entirely one sector are not truly
diversified and their performance is held hostage to the health and
vibrancy of the overall housing market - a market that has
fluctuated before.193
By divorcing mortgage originators from the risk of default,
securitization reduced lenders' traditional incentive to scrutinize
their borrowers and encouraged excessive risk-taking and
improper risk assessments. Multiple securitizations of the same
loan made it virtually impossible for lenders to monitor the
creditworthiness of borrowers-a task which they, in effect,
outsourced to credit rating agencies.19 4 As these new financial
187. Id.
188. See CSI: credit crunch, supra note 25.
189. See Eric Lipton & Raymond Hernandez, A Champion of Wall Street Reaps
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/business/
14schumer.html?emc=etal.
190. Id.
191. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 86.
192. See id. at 87.
193. See id.
194. See Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve
[Vol. 13
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
products were created, regulators virtually "threw up their hands
and allowed the banks to apply their own (supposedly)
sophisticated risk models, or to rely on bond rating agencies."'95
Credit rating agencies like Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch
Ratings, paid far more to rate complex mortgage-related securities
than to assess more traditional forms of debt, severely
underestimated the mortgage debt risks or were blindsided by
large profits when they assigned their highest credit rating of
"AAA" to some securities that contained these loans. While
millions of investors relied on credit rating agencies for
independent, objective risk assessments of the ever increasingly
complex mortgage securities they purchased, this bond of trust was
badly broken. Credit rating agencies refused to account for the
lending standards which sharply declined during the housing
bubble, claiming that they had no responsibility to evaluate the
quality of each individual mortgage loan bundled. 116 Frank A.
Raiter, who was the head of mortgage ratings at Standard &
Poor's for ten years, recently remarked that "[p]rofits were
running the show."' 97 For example, Moody's benefited from higher
profit margins during the housing bubble than those of the most
elite Fortune 500 companies such as Exxon and Microsoft. 98 Since
credit rating agencies receive most of their income from the
corporations they rate, certain obvious questions can be brought
forth concerning their underlying motivations and levels of
independence and objectivity. These credit rating agencies are
now under heavy scrutiny for giving stellar ratings to securitization
Sys., Comments at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity on 'Financial
Regulation in a System Context,' 'Beyond Leveraged Losses: The Balance Sheet
Effects of the Home Price Downturn,' and 'The Central Role of House Prices in the
Financial Crisis: How Will the Market Clear?,' Brookings Panel on Economic
Activity, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/kohn2008O9lla.htm.
195. Norris, supra note 186.
196. See Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at Al.
197. Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/economy/
23rating.html?scp=1&sq=credit%20rating&st=cse.
198. See Morgenson, supra note 196.
199. See Unterman, supra note 44, at 123.
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transactions based on subprime loans.' °° According to a Moody's
managing director's anonymous response to an internal
management survey in September 2007, "[t]hese errors make us
look either incompetent at credit analysis or like we sold our soul
to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of both.,
20 1
Undoubtedly, these credit rating agencies missed serious
problems in the mortgage-related securities they allegedly
scrutinized. Despite their high ratings, many of those securities,
based on risky loans, would prove worthless, roiling markets and
threatening financial institutions worldwide. Standard & Poor's
has downgraded more than two-thirds of its investment-grade
ratings, and Moody's has reduced assigned ratings on over five
thousand mortgage-backed securities. These unrealistically
positive investment-grade rating designations created a
consequent surge in global demand for U.S. subprime securities by
banks, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies,
investment banks, commercial banks, municipalities, and foreign
investors, and helped finance the housing boom. The world was
filled with money seeking higher returns, and much of this capital
was invested in U.S. assets. Many billions of dollars of these
securities were also purchased by ordinary investors-typically
through mutual funds, bonds, and preferred stock-who likely did
not know what exactly they had purchased and were often misled
as to the particular risk of their investments . 20 3
In recent years, the market for mortgage-backed securities
was plagued by incredible opaqueness, considerable imprudence,
and a remarkable lack of due diligence on the part of mortgage
originators, the bundlers of mortgage-backed securities, and the
buyers of the same. This led to severe moral hazard and
information-asymmetry problems in this market. Moral hazard is
the notion that those protected against certain risky behavior have
an incentive to engage in such activities. 24  Each link in the
200. See Morgenson, supra note 196 (noting that Moody's, in recent disclosures in
its regulatory filings, has indicated its receipt of subpoenas from state attorneys
general and other authorities relating to its role in the financial crisis).
201. Id.
202. Morgenson, supra note 197.
203. See Berkowitz, supra note 124, at 122.
204. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage
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mortgage chain collected profits while believing it was passing on
risk: brokers, not lending their own money, pushed risk onto
lenders, who sold mortgages soon after underwriting them and
then pushed risk onto investors, who bought securities and hedged
against the risk of default and prepayment, pushing those risks
further down the pipe. More fundamentally, the financial turmoil
is the aftermath of a credit boom characterized by the
underpricing of risk, excessive leverage, and an increasing reliance
on complex and opaque financial instruments that have proved to
201be extremely fragile under stress.
B. Turning a Blind Eye: Why Worry Now If We Don't Have
To?
By the middle of 2007, a rude awakening set in as investors
and consumers came to grasp that these mortgage products could
be dangerous, if not poisonous, in an increasingly likely economic
downturn. Even as analysts and officials began ringing warning
bells about exotic mortgages and how an increasing number of
mortgages were being paid late or not at all, investors saw little
reason to abandon the securities backed by these home mortgage
206loans. Motivated by the dazzling fees, it seems like nobody
worried about monitoring the quality of the loans, and the
likelihood of whether the mortgage payments would actually be
made. The cast of characters who missed signals like the rise of
delinquencies and foreclosures include investment banks
motivated to sell risky but lucrative mortgage debt to investors and
Crisis, 61 SMU L. REV. 209, 215 (2008); see also Wynkoop, supra note 155, at 3120
(citing Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis.
L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1991)); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 237 (1996)).
205. See Economic Recovery: Options and Challenges: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing 5] (testimony of Ben
S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.).
206. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas Bajaj, How Missed Signs Contributed to a
Mortgage Meltdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007108/19/
business/19credit.html; Jeremy W. Peters, Bankers Report More Mortgages Being
Paid Late or Not at All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006112/
14/business/14mortgage.html; Vikas Bajaj, Mortgages Grow Riskier, and Investors
Are Attracted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/
business/06place.html.
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investment funds, pension funds eager for high interest payments,
credit rating agencies willing to hope for the best in the housing
market and give superior credit appraisals, and subprime mortgage
brokers who sought high sales volumes.""
The situations at both Merrill Lynch and Citigroup are
illustrative cases in point of the predominant attitude concerning
investment management and risk undertaking that came to
dominate Wall Street and our financial system. E. Stanley O'Neal,
the former chief executive of Merrill Lynch who was displaced
from his position in late 2007 due to significant write-downs and
quarterly losses during his watch, commented in 2005 that "[w]e've
got the right people in place as well as good risk management and
controls., 208 Senior executives at Merrill Lynch helped push the
firm's profitable mortgage investment program and, in doing so,
left their firm vulnerable to the increasingly risky business ofmortage-acke ... 209
mortgage-backed securities. Former Merrill Lynch executives
have indicated that the firm's top levels of management loosened
internal controls and risk management oversight and went even as
far as silencing critics who warned about the risks the firm was
undertaking. Employees who "walked the floor" and talked
with traders and other workers to assess the risks the firm was
taking on were replaced with "loyal lieutenants" to the firm's
management who were, therefore, more concerned with achieving
superior profit goals than with monitoring risk."' In simple terms,
some managers seen as impediments to Merrill's securitization
strategy were pushed out.2
Citigroup's economic woes are also very representative of
the deficient risk management mechanisms and the quest for profit
207. See Schwartz & Bajaj, supra note 206.
208. Morgenson, supra note 144.
209. See id.; Pulliam et al., supra note 168.
210. Morgenson, supra note 144.
211. Id.
212. Pulliam et al., supra note 168 (noting that some former Merrill Lynch
executives provided the example of Jeffrey Kronthal, who had imposed informal
limits on the amount of CDO exposure the firm could keep on its books and on its
risk of possible CDO losses and who, along with two other bond managers, was
dismissed in mid-2006, a time when the housing market was still strong but was
peaking).
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that enveloped Wall Street."' It was only at a board meeting of
Citigroup executives held in September 2007, when Wall Street
was already confronting a credit crisis, that Charles 0. Prince III,
Citigroup's then-chief executive, became aware that his institution
owned about $43 billion in mortgage-related assets.214 Thomas G.
Maderas, who oversaw bank trading, reassured Mr. Prince and
other officials at Citigroup that no substantial losses were on the
horizon and downplayed the firm's vulnerabilities. 2" At an
analysts' call during November 2007, Gary Crittenden, Citigroup
CFO, refused to give assurances that the write-downs were over,
illustrating a great lack of confidence in his own valuations and a
211
remarkable inability to value even his own firm's holdings.
Within several weeks, Citigroup announced several billions of
dollars in mortgage-related losses. As a consequence of
"longstanding ties that clouded their judgment," the individuals in
charge of risk management searched for easy profits and ways to
increase executives' multi-million-dollar bonuses while
overlooking the significant risks that they had undertaken through
subprime mortgage holdings. Between 2003 and 2005, Citigroup
increased its issuance of CDOs from $6.28 billion to over $20
billion, making the bank one of the industry's largest players, while
it made up to $500 million just in fees from the CDO business in
the year 2005 alone.218 Furthermore, Citigroup's risk models failed
to account for the possibility of a national housing downturn in
which mortgage defaults would have ruinous effects on all
219
mortgage-related investments. One little known banking analyst
213. See Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made
Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at Al.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. See Morris, supra note 129, at xi.
217. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 213.
218. Id.
219. See Executive Compensation II: CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis, Hearing
Before the H.R. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2008)
[hereinafter Hearing 6] (testimony of Charles 0. Prince III, former Citigroup
chairman and chief executive) (noting that during the fall of 2007, "it became
apparent that the risk models which Citigroup, the various rating agencies, and the
rest of the financial community used to assess certain mortgage-backed securities
were wrong"); Dash & Creswell, supra note 213; Eric Dash, Citigroup Acknowledges
Poor Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, at C9.
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of financial firms for Oppenheimer Securities declared more than
a year ago that Citigroup's significant mismanagement of its
business engagements would impair its dividend or ultimate
survival as a firm.22° While bankers and brokers claimed that
write-downs or capital injections solved their financial woes, this
analyst quickly countered with her own assertion (now recognized
as having a surprising amount of validity) that the financial firms
were not recognizing the true extent of their mismanagement.:2
When housing prices began falling in 2006, bank regulators
and executives generally agreed that there would be losses, but
they would be widely disseminated and the impact would be
limited.222 They insisted, with naivet6, that the financial system had
been strengthened and made more resilient by deregulation,
technological innovation, and the globalization of capital flows.
223
V. AND THINGS WENT SOUR...
A. The Housing Crisis Morphs into a Banking Crisis
When the speculative fever finally broke in America's
housing industry and housing prices began falling in search of
equilibrium levels, banks and financial institutions everywhere
suffered defaults and subsequent losses on a range of assets. The
deflation of the housing bubble has brought a steep rise in
mortgage defaults and foreclosures which, together with concerns
about poor mortgage underwriting standards, have caused
substantial declines in the values of MBSs. As the payments from
borrowers on the mortgages in the securitization pool became
delinquent or stopped all together, the value of the mortgage-
backed securities began to decline and become uncertain, costing
portfolio managers millions or billions of dollars in losses. These
MBSs and other forms of widely held securitized debt, especially
220. See Michael Lewis, The End, CONDIE NAST PORTFOLIO, Dec. 2008/Jan. 2009,
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11Fhe-End-
of-Wall-Streets-Boom (describing the efforts of Meredith Whitney, analyst of
financial firms for Oppenheimer Securities, New York, NY).
221. Id.
222. Steve Lohr, Government's Leap Into Banking Has Its Perils, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2008, at Al.
223. Id.
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the subordinate tranches, quickly became "toxic waste" on the
balance sheets of major banks and financial institutions, forcing
them to incur huge write-downs, as accounting rules required that
the assets be marked-to-market. The intent of the mark-to-market
accounting standard is to keep markets transparent by helping
investors understand the value of these assets at a point in time,
rather than just their historical purchase price. As we marched
through 2007 and into 2008, more banks and financial institutions
found that the securities they thought were safe were tainted with
what came to be called "toxic mortgages." Indeed, the housing
contraction has caused large losses for anyone who bought assets
backed by mortgage payments.
The losses on these widely held mortgage-related
investments have created an enormous capital hole on the balance
224
sheets of many financial institutions. These heavy financial
losses have left many financial institutions with too little capital.
As asset write-downs have been made, these financial institutions
have needed to raise capital to cover the losses. Furthermore, as
the financial markets progressively lost faith in asset-backed
securities and as housing prices continued to fall, bids for these
securities became scarce. The losses on the assets also reduced the
institutions' capital, resulting in increased pressure to maintain
capital at the minimum levels required by regulation. The
soundness of any investment firm depends, to a significant degree,
on other financial firms having confidence that it has real assets
standing behind its investments. Any institution that seems to
have had a high-risk portfolio, regardless of whether it has had
enough assets to support the portfolio, has faced two substantial
setbacks occurring at the same time: investors demanding their
money back, and lenders refusing to do any more business with
them. Individual firms that owned large amounts of these
securities were caught in a downward spiral of devalued securities
224. See Kashkari, supra note 59 (stating that "[c]apital is essential for a healthy
financial system; it permits banks to take risks and absorb losses while honoring their
obligations to depositors and other creditors. During an economic downturn, many
businesses and consumers want to see extra capital in their bank in order to have
confidence the bank is sound and their money safe. Similarly, in such times, many
banks want to see increased capital in other banks in order to have confidence to do
business with them").
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and reduced capital. Such actions progressively undermined the
market value of the firms' stock and market confidence in the
firms' solvency. Because financial institutions have had too little
capital relative to their assets, they have not been able or willing to
provide the credit the economy needs. The erosion of capital has
resulted in some instances in bankruptcy or insolvency in the case
of FDIC-insured banks. Those institutions able to raise a
sufficient amount of capital have so far been able to survive, while
those unable to raise adequate capital have failed, sometimes quite
unexpectedly and with devastating impact. In short order, the
housing contraction morphed into a severe banking crisis.
Securities firms are not subject to as stringent a minimum
25capital requirement as banks. If, however, they are owned by a
bank or financial holding company, the holding company on a
consolidated basis is subject to the bank capital requirements to
ensure that it is operated in a manner that does not threaten the
viability of its depository institution subsidiaries.2 As a result of
this regulatory landscape, many investment banks retained limited
capital reserves to address significant declines in mortgage-backed
securities, other mortgage-related investments, or to support their
side of credit default derivative insurance contracts, creating a
huge liquidity crisis.
B. The Fallout at Bear Stearns
The paralysis in the credit markets and the collapse of
liquidity in these MBSs led to continued substantial write-downs in
2007, 2008, and 2009. In June 2007, Moody's, a credit rating
agency, slashed the ratings of 131 securities backed by subprime
mortgages and said it was reviewing the grades of 136 others."7 In
terms of failure of a major financial institution, the first shoe to
225. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008) (providing the net capital requirements for
brokers or dealers).
226. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act,
dismantled the remaining Depression-era restrictions and allowed commercial banks,
investment banks, and insurance companies to be operated under the same holding
company. These changes allowed consolidated financial holding companies to
expand well beyond their traditional role as lenders and profit from a broad variety
of financial activities.
227. CSI: credit crunch, supra note 25.
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drop was at the Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., an investment bank
based in New York City that had borrowed $33 for every dollar of
assets it had 2  Bear Stearns was severely damaged by the July
2007 collapse of two giant hedge funds, together once worth an
estimated $1.5 billion, which had suffered huge losses after betting
on securities backed by subprime mortgages.2 29 This particular
financial firm was one of the largest global investment banks and
securities trading and brokerage firms prior to its eventual collapse
in March 2008 due to its inability to find sufficient capital to cover
its mortgage-related losses. On March 14, 2008, after a consistent
decline in the market for subprime mortgages, JPMorgan Chase, in
conjunction with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
provided a twenty-eight day emergency loan to Bear Stearns in
order to avert the sudden collapse of the company and prevent the
potential market crash that would result from Bear Stearns
becoming insolvent. The company could not be saved, however,
and was sold to JPMorgan Chase for approximately ten dollars per
share, a price far below the $172 a share it traded at as late as
January 2007, although not as low as the two dollars per share
210
originally agreed upon by Bear Stearns and JP Morgan Chase.
In addition, the Federal Reserve agreed to issue a non-recourse
loan of $29 billion to JP Morgan Chase, thereby assuming the risk
of Bear Stearns's less liquid assets. This means that the loan is
collateralized by mortgage debt and that the federal government
cannot seize JPMorgan Chase's other assets if the mortgage debt
collateral becomes insufficient to repay the loan. The Federal
Reserve defended the bailout by stating that a Bear Stearns'
bankruptcy would have affected the real economy and could have
caused a substantial and rapid unwinding of investments across
U.S. markets. 21' Bear Stearns, and other institutions as well,
228. See Daniel Gross, A Risk Worth Taking, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 2008, http://
www.newsweek.comlid/1.69160.
229. See Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds Are Worth
Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C2; CSI: credit crunch, supra note 25.
230. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns to $10 a
Share, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/business/
24deal-web.html.
231. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal
Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing 7] (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke,
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wound up in trouble not as a result of problems with "economic
fundamentals" but, rather, due to the falling prices of mortgage-
backed securities which forced these institutions to mark their
securities down to the deflated market prices.232 As a result, these
institutions' contractual counterparties became fearful that they
would not be able to settle trades with clients and then, as in the
Bear Stearns' situation, refused to do further business with such
institutions .233
C. Interest Rate Reductions
The risks to the broader economy created by the financial
market crisis and housing market downturn were also primary
factors in several decisions by the Federal Reserve to cut interest
rates. Between September 2007 and May 2008, the target for the
federal funds rate, the benchmark interest rate, was lowered from
5.25% to 2%, and the discount rate was lowered from 5.75% to
2.25%, through six separate actions. As the U.S. continues to
confront a severe financial crisis and recession, the Federal
Reserve recently cut its target interest rate again to between zero
and a quarter percentage point,234 reaching historic lows. Another
Federal Reserve lending rate, the discount rate, will drop to half a
percentage point, a level not seen since the 1940s, as the Federal
Reserve expects interest rates to remain "exceptionally low" for
235some time. While lower rates generally spark borrowing and
boost economic activity in normal times by reducing the cost of
borrowing for households, businesses, and financial institutions,
those effects are offset now as many businesses and households are
increasingly burdened by heavy debts. Traditionally, interest rate
reductions have served as the main ammunition used to confront a
recession, but these recent cuts have not slowed the economy's
Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.).
232. Schwarcz, supra note 204, at 214.
233. Id.
234. See Federal Reserve Bank Discount Window & Payments System Risk,
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
235. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., FOMC
Statement (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/monetary/20081216b.htm.
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decline - a remarkable illustration of the serious challenges this
particular recession poses to government officials, policymakers,
and ordinary Americans alike.
D. Continued Fallout - the Losses Keep Mounting
While the Federal Reserve took unprecedented steps to
bolster Wall Street and the financial markets, the losses still
mounted. For the fourth quarter of 2007, Morgan Stanley took a
$9.4 billion loss related to subprime-related investments, 236 and in
January 2008, Citigroup announced that it was writing down $22.2
billion due to "mortgage-related investments and bad loans.,
23 7
Exposure to these mortgage-backed securities, or to the credit
derivatives used to insure them against failure, threatened an ever
increasing number of banks and financial and investment firms.
Rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on $1.9 trillion in
mortgage-backed securities from the third quarter of 2007 to the
second quarter of 2008.38 These factors placed additional pressure
on financial institutions to lower the value of their mortgage-
backed securities. Hedge funds began to find it more difficult to
get financing as Wall Street banks, themselves feeling the pain of
the credit squeeze, became less willing to lend money against
mortgage securities. As investors lost confidence in them, these
firms saw their access to liquidity and capital markets increasingly
impaired and their stock prices drop sharply. On July 11, 2008,
IndyMac Bank, the largest mortgage lender in the U.S. at the time,
collapsed and its assets were seized by federal regulators after the
institution succumbed to the pressures of tighter credit, tumbling
home prices, and rising foreclosures. IndyMac Bank's failure
marked the third largest bank failure in U.S. history.239
236. See Landon Thomas, Jr., $9.4 Billion Write-Down at Morgan Stanley, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at C2.
237. See Eric Dash, Citigroup Loses $9.8 Billion; Will Cut Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2008, at C1.
238. See Jon Birger, The Woman Who Called Wall Street's Meltdown, FORTUNE,
Aug. 6, 2008, at 68.
239. See Damian Paletta & David Enrich, Crisis Deepens as Big Bank Fails, WALL
ST. J., July 12, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121581435073947103.html.
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E. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - Further Government Bailout
and Conservatorship
The Bear Stearns bailout briefly lulled the financial
markets into thinking that the worst might be over. But,
conditions continued to deteriorate. In August 2008, government
officials became concerned as the stock prices of the loss-plagued
finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the linchpins of the
housing market, slid sharply. "From 2005 to 2008, Fannie Mae
purchased or guaranteed $270 billion in loans to risky borrowers -
triple the amount in all its earlier years combined."24  These
actions, which would turn out to be a serious mistake in risk
management, were largely due to efforts by shareholders and
managers to recover the securitization market share lost to
unregulated investment banks which had received "absurd AAA
ratings for packaging subprime dross."24' The Federal Reserve had
issued repeated cautions about the systemic risks posed by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac's large portfolios of mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities, in addition to the inherent conflicts
arising from the tension between shareholders' goals and the
government's objectives for these two institutions.42  Given the
substantial losses in their mortgage portfolios, raising sufficient
new capital from private investors was infeasible and the
government-sponsored status of the two firms did not leave
available the option of a merger with or acquisition by another
company. 43 To preclude "unacceptably large dislocations in the
financial sector, the housing market, and the greater economy,"
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship on September 7, 2008, and
the Treasury used its authority, granted by Congress in July 2008,
to invest as much as $200 billion in preferred stock of Fannie Mae
240. Barr & Sperling, supra note 86.
241. Id.
242. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Current Economic and Financial Conditions, at the National Ass'n for Business
Economics 50th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., (Oct. 7, 2008).
243. Id.
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and Freddie Mac and at least $5 billion in their mortgage
securities .24 4
F. Say Goodbye to Lehman and Merrill Lynch
Notwithstanding this string of substantial government
intervention, investors' and creditors' concerns about funding and
credit risks at financial firms intensified during the latter part of
the summer of 2008 as mortgage-related assets deteriorated
further, economic growth slowed, and uncertainty about the
financial and economic outlook increased. The housing market
downturn continued to have a substantial impact on the
performance of leading financial institutions' mortgage portfolios
and led to multiple quarters of multi-billion dollar losses. Leading
banks and financial institutions came under heavy pressure
because they possessed insufficient capital. As mortgage-related
losses mounted, investors and creditors lost confidence in the
ability of certain firms to meet their obligations and risk aversion
heightened. Customers began pulling their money out of
brokerage accounts, concerned about the safety of their assets. As
a result, financial institutions, seeing their access to capital markets
as well as to short-term funding markets become increasingly
impaired and their stock prices fall significantly, faced additional
pressure to raise more capital to cover these losses and the
outflows of brokerage deposits. All three major stock indices in
the United States (the Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ,
and the S&P 500) entered a bear market by late summer 2008.
But it was the weekend of September 13, 2008, and the moment
that then-Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. had feared for
months was finally here: Lehman Brothers, the renowned global
financial services firm with billions of dollars in bad mortgage-
related investments on its books, was hurtling toward bankruptcy
- rapidly. When the stock markets opened on Monday,
September 15, 2008, a slew of financial concerns, including a host
of legitimate worries about Lehman's fate, caused the Dow Jones
industrial average to drop by 504.48 points, or 4.4%-the sharpest
244. Id.
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drop since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks-as a record
volume of over eight billion shares were traded on the New York
241Stock Exchange.
The collapse of the major investment bank Lehman
Brothers on September 15, 2008 became the largest bankruptcy in
241American history. Its cascading effects sent shockwaves across
not only the United States, but the rest of the globe as well. The
complex debt products held by major financial institutions such as
Lehman Brothers and others proved to be "risk bombs," as there
was no central exchange, or open marketplace, where the
mortgage-backed securities were listed or traded. 247 This meant
that no one recognized or comprehended how substantial the
failure of risk management really was. The firm said its third-
quarter 2008 losses could total almost $4 billion. Lehman's
clearing bank, J.P. Morgan, wanted an extra $5 billion in collateral,
and Lehman's attempts to raise money from a Korean bank had
stalled. Credit rating agencies warned that if Lehman was unable
to raise more capital immediately, it could face a downgrade, likely
forcing it to put up more collateral for its outstanding loans and
increase its costs for new loans. Attempts to organize a
consortium of private firms to purchase some of Lehman's toxic
assets and efforts to persuade other banks such as Bank of
America and Barclays to acquire Lehman were unsuccessful as the
potential suitors backed out of negotiations after the federal
government refused to offer guarantees to possible buyers. Simply
stated, "buyers walked away for one reason: they could not get the
equivalent kind of government backing that had facilitated the
Bear Stearns deal. 24 With respect to public sector solutions, the
government determined that either facilitating a sale of Lehman or
maintaining the company as a free-standing entity would have
required a very sizable injection of public funds-much larger than
245. See Stephen Labaton, Wall St. in Worst Loss Since '01 Despite Reassurances
by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
246. See Sam Mamudi, Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt,
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/story.aspx?
guid=% 7B2FE5AC05-597A-4E71-A2D5-9B9FCC290520%7D&siteid=rss.
247. Lohr, supra note 222.
248. Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Struggling to Keep Up as the Crisis Raced
On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at Al.
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for Bear Stearns-and would have involved the U.S. taxpayers'
assumption of billions of dollars of expected losses.249 Under the
law, the Federal Reserve has the authority to lend to any nonbank,
but only if the loan is "secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
Reserve bank., 250 Even if these costs could be justified on public
policy grounds, neither the Treasury Department nor the Federal
Reserve had the authority to commit public money in such fashion;
in particular, the Federal Reserve's loans "must be sufficiently
secured to provide reasonable assurance that the loan will be fully
repaid., 25 1 Such collateral was not available here.
The decision to allow Lehman to fail resulted in global
panic sweeping over the financial system, causing other banks to
fall like dominos and "turn[ed] a financial tremor into a
tsunami., 25 2  The government's unwillingness or inability to
prevent Lehman's failure added more fear to already shaken
financial markets. Lehman's failure, in particular, created
financial havoc and fear because numerous investors who had
uninsured accounts with, or other financial exposure to, Lehman,
suddenly lost the ability to access their cash, with no idea of how
much, if anything, they would be able to eventually recover.
Beginning with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the
financial crisis entered an acute phase marked by failures of
prominent American and European banks and sweeping efforts by
the American and European governments to rescue distressed
financial institutions. After an exhausting and arguably
unfulfilling weekend of talks between Wall Street executives and
federal officials over the fate of Lehman Brothers, fear spread that
Merrill Lynch, also staggered by mortgage losses, could also falter.
Like Bear Stearns before them, both Lehman Brothers and Merrill
Lynch were more deeply involved than other institutions in the
securitization market that allowed too many mortgages to get into
the hands of unqualified homebuyers. Merrill's clients began to
249. Bernanke, supra note 242.
250. Federal Reserve Act § 13(a), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
251. Bernanke, supra note 242.
252. Dwight Cass & Hugo Dixon, Was Lehman Loss All That Bad?,
BREAKINGVIEWS.COM, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/
economy/22views.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; see also Nocera & Andrews, supra
note 248.
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pull their money out and the firm's stock plunged. Merrill Lynch,
a blue-chip investment house and bedrock global financial services
institution founded in 1914 and the nation's largest brokerage firm,
had long promoted the idea that anyone, not just the rich, should
invest in the markets."' Yet this same institution, which had lost
more than $45 billion on its mortgage investments, twice the total
amount of profit the firm made in the two and a half years prior to
the credit crisis, agreed to sell itself on September 14, 2008, to
Bank of America for $50.3 billion in stock.254 It was "a remarkable
fall from grace for the 94-year-old Merrill, whose corporate logo
- a bull - ha[d] long symbolized the fundamental optimism of
Wall Street." '255
However, the demise of Merrill Lynch might have seemed
inevitable to some. Since the financial crisis first began, Merrill
was among the firms most deeply affected. Under the leadership
of its former chief executive, E. Stanley O'Neal, Merrill made
aggressive moves into the mortgage market and became one of the
leading issuers of investment vehicles linked to subprime
mortgages and other risky forms of debt.256 In 2003, Merrill Lynch
hired Christopher Ricciardi, an expert in CDOs from Credit
Suisse, then the leading underwriter of CDOs.2 11 Such moves
helped make the firm become the largest underwriter of CDOs in
the world by the end of 2003, a distinction it retained in 2004, 2005
and 2006.258 As the firm bundled mortgage debt - even derivatives
of derivatives - and made a string of twelve acquisitions of
residential or commercial mortgage-related companies or assets to
capitalize on the housing boom between January 2005 and January
2007, Merrill's revenue and earnings reached record levels, and, in
253. Louise Story, Stunning Fall for Main Street's Brokerage Firm, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2008, at Al.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See Greg Morcroft, Merrill swings to loss on huge mortgage hit,
MARKETWATCH, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/ Story/merrill-
lynch-shares-tumble-write-downs/story.aspx?guid=%7B68BB8376%2D3BF3%2D4
67D%2DB40B%2D0CF991CC088F%7D; see also Pulliam et al., supra note 168.
257. See Alistair Barr, Merrill's push comes back to bite firm, MARKETWATCH,
Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/merrills-push-cdos-comes-
back/story.aspx?guid=%7B5A72DF69-FB48-481C-8266-D874286BFBEC%7D.
258. See id.; Pulliam et al., supra note 168.
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2192006, its stock prices had soared by forty percent for the year.
Merrill Lynch appeared to have no liquidity concerns; after its
record year of profits in 2006, it produced another solid earnings
report in the first quarter of 2007, finally surpassing its three main
rivals, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Bear Stearns, in
profit growth.260 But as 2007 progressed and mortgage defaults and
foreclosures started piling up, the debt ratings on CDOs were
cut.26' As the waves of borrower defaults continued in 2007,
Merrill was left with $71 billion of eroding investments and billions
in losses.2 62 "It turned out our assessment of the potential risk and
261
mitigation strategies were inadequate," O'Neal commented. In
October 2007, Merrill shocked investors when it announced a $7.9
billion write-down related to its exposure to mortgage CDOs,
264
resulting in a $2.3 billion loss, its largest ever in history. In a
conference call with analysts in October 2007, O'Neal added that
"[w]e got too big in this area. Primary mistakes were errors of
judgment and understanding the nature of the risk and the
markets changing for the securities. 265
Multi-billion losses kept piling up, however, and Merrill
struggled to raise sufficient capital to sustain itself. John A. Thain,
the new chief executive who had previously held senior positions
at the New York Stock Exchange and Goldman Sachs, liquidated
assets for whatever price he could obtain to try to salvage the firm.
In late 2007, Thain, seeking to regain investors' trust by
strengthening and solidifying the firm's risk management and
helping Merrill work through its heavy CDOs exposure, rehired
the risk-conscious bond executive 266 Merrill had previously
dismissed in 2006 when it aggressively pushed to increase its bets
on CDOs. 267 Mr. Thain also undertook seven major transactions
during the summer of 2008 with the aim to strengthen Merrill.
259. See Morgenson, supra note 144.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Morcroft, supra note 256.
264. Morgenson, supra note 144.
265. Barr, supra note 257.
266. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
267. See Pulliam, supra note 168.
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These actions included the sale of Merrill's $4.4 billion stake in
Bloomberg, the financial news and data service, the raising of $9.8
billion of common equity, and the sale of $31 billion of its CDOs
to an investment firm for twenty-two cents on the dollar.268
Despite these efforts, Merrill recorded net losses of $14.7 billion
on its CDOs, for the first nine months of 2008, and through
October 2008, some $260 billion of asset-backed CDOs started to
default.269  As these problems deepened, Merrill's shares
plummeted. In a startling turn of events, Bank of America's
acquisition of Merrill Lynch marked the end of an era for "the
brokerage firm that brought Wall Street to Main Street.,
270
G. The Demise of American International Group (A.L G.)
While perhaps manageable by itself, Lehman's default was
also combined with the unexpectedly rapid collapse of American
International Group (A.I.G.), an insurance giant then on the verge
of failure because of its exposure to risky mortgage-related
investments and credit-default swaps. A.I.G.'s financial arm,
A.I.G. Financial Products, had accrued a very sizeable amount of
exposure to mortgage-related assets, and as a result, it was
carrying enormous unrecognized losses on its books. On
September 15, 2008, the same day that Lehman Brothers
announced its bankruptcy, A.I.G.'s auditors forced A.I.G. to
recognize some of these losses. Although A.I.G. had issued $440
billion in credit-default swaps, only 0.8% of credit-default swaps
outstanding, markdowns on A.I.G.'s investments in subprime
mortgages led to significant downgrades in its credit ratings,
causing the holders of the credit-default swaps to demand more
collateral, which A.I.G. could not provide.' On September 16,
2008, the Federal Reserve, with the support of the Treasury,
provided an $85 billion emergency credit line to facilitate an
orderly resolution.2 In exchange for making the loan, the Fed was
268. See id.; Story, supra note 253.
269. Morgenson, supra note 144.
270. Story, supra note 253.
271. Cox, supra note 159.
272. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Board, with full support of the Treasury Department, authorizes the Federal Reserve
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promised a 79.9% stake in A.I.G.2 1' A.I.G. negotiated the original
$85 billion revolving credit line with the Federal Reserve after its
efforts to raise money from private lenders failed in the panic of
mid-September. The government's initial intervention was driven
by concern that A.I.G.'s failure to meet its obligations in the
credit-default swap market would create a global financial
meltdown.274
The amount that A.I.G. needed, however, ballooned very
shortly, as counterparties to A.I.G.'s insurance on complex debt
securities laid claims to whatever collateral they could get. The
original emergency loan was later supplemented by a $38 billion
lending facility in early November 2008 when it became clear that
275the original amount was insufficient. A.I.G. has needed more
money than expected, and it has not been able to sell subsidiaries
quickly enough to pay down the loan as required. The
government's original emergency line of credit, while saving
A.I.G. from seeking bankruptcy protection for a time, accelerated
the company's problems; the original emergency loan came with a
high interest rate - about fourteen percent - which forced the
company into a rushed asset sale which hindered its capacity to
repay the loan, jeopardizing its solvency. 276 By mid-November
2008, after signs that the initial bailout was overly burdensome on
the company, the federal government announced an overhaul of
its original bailout of A.I.G., replacing it with a new package worth
around $150 billion.277 The $150 billion in government aid consists
of a "$60 billion loan, a $40 billion preferred-stock investment with
Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group
(AIG) (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
other/20080916a.htm.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Board and Treasury Department announce restructuring of financial support to AIG
(Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other
20081110a.htm.
276. Matthew Karnitschnig, Serena Ng & Liam Plevin, U.S. Throws New Lifeline
to AIG, Scrapping Original Rescue Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122630276296413267.html?mod=testMod; see also Andrew
Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Provides More Aid to Big Insurer, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/business/economy/llaig.
html?-r=l&hp&oref=slogin.
277. See Press Release, supra note 275.
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funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and about
$50 billion in capital largely intended to purchase distressed
assets." '278 These funds will help A.I.G. purchase CDOs and
mortgage-backed securities from institutional investors which the
company had agreed to insure against default, a role which has
forced it to put up large amounts of cash as collateral as the global
economy has soured and securities have increasingly weakened
and defaulted.79 The Federal Reserve took these actions because
it judged that, in light of the prevailing market conditions and the
size and composition of A.I.G.'s obligations, a disorderly failure of
A.I.G. would have severely threatened global financial stability
and the performance of the U.S. economy. 8° In early December
2008, A.I.G. disclosed that it owed Wall Street's largest firms
about $10 billion for speculative trades that have soured,
highlighting the challenges the company continues to face as it
seeks to recover under the U.S. government rescue plan. This
latest news also indicates that A.I.G. has been "gambling with its
own capital" by speculating on the direction of pools of mortgage
assets and corporate debt.28'
When pressed about why it was legal for the Federal
Reserve to lend billions of dollars to Bear Stearns and A.I.G. but
not Lehman Brothers, then-Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson
Jr. emphasized that Lehman's bad assets created "a huge hole" on
its balance sheet; by contrast, Bear Stearns and A.I.G. had more
trustworthy collateral.282 But perhaps most significantly, the era of
less government and reliance on market forces has ended: when
the restructured deal is complete, taxpayers will have invested and
lent a total of $150 billion to A.I.G., the largest government rescue
of a single private enterprise in history.283
278. See id.; Walsh, supra note, 276; Karnitschnig, Ng & Plevin, supra note 276.
279. See id.
280. Hearing, supra note 4 (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.).
281. See Serena Ng, Carrick Mollenkamp & Michael Siconolfi, AIG Faces $10
Billion in Losses on Bad Bets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122887203792493481-email.html.
282. See Nocera & Andrews, supra note 248; supra note 244 and accompanying
text.
283. See Sorkin & Walsh, supra note 276.
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H. WaMu and Wachovia Succumb
Even after those dramatic and eye-opening events, more
depressing news followed. During the same month, Washington
Mutual (WaMu), which at the time was the sixth-largest bank in
the United States, declared bankruptcy. WaMu, a Seattle-based
bank, stands out as a particularly noteworthy case of lax lending.
By the first half of 2008, the value of its bad loans had reached
$11.5 billion, nearly tripling from $4.2 billion a year earlier, and its
adjustable-rate mortgages expanded from about one-fourth of new
home loans in 2003 to 70% by 2006."' In 2007, it incurred a $67
million loss and closed its subprime lending unit. When
shareholders attended WaMu's annual meeting in Seattle in April
2008, WaMu had recorded a first-quarter loss of $1.14 billion and
increased its loan loss reserve to $3.5 billion, while its stock had
286lost more than half its value in the prior two months. As market
conditions worsened, pressure on WaMu intensified; an outflow of
deposits began on September 16, 2008, totaling $16.7 billion.287
With insufficient liquidity to meet its obligations, WaMu was in an
unsafe and unsound condition to transact business. Its federal
regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, closed that company
and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
as receiver, which then immediately sold the institution to
JPMorgan Chase. This was the largest bank failure in American
history.288
Wachovia Corporation, a financial services holding
company, also witnessed a dismal financial outlook as a result of
its substantial exposure to subprime mortgages. Wachovia's recent
struggles can be traced back to a single, mistaken deal at the height
of the housing bubble in May 2006: its $25 billion purchase of
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See Ari Levy & Elizabeth Hester, JPMorgan Buys WaMu Deposits;
Regulators Seize Thrift, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 26, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.
comapps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aWxliUXHsOoA&refer=home.
288. See Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, Washington Mutual Acquired
by JPMorgan Chase (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://ots.gov/?p=PressReleases&
ContentRecordid=9c306c81-1e0b-8562-eb0c-fed5429a3a56&ContentTypeid=4c12f
337-b5b6-4c87-b45c-838958422bf3.
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Golden West Financial Corporation, a savings and loan that
became one of California's largest lenders. When former
Wachovia Chief Executive Officer Ken Thompson brokered the
deal to purchase Golden West Financial, he commented that he
had acquired "a crown jewel" of the mortgage business. As a
result of this acquisition, however, Wachovia acquired substantial
exposure to subprime mortgages in California and Florida, both
hot real estate markets that went bust. The great majority of those
home loans were option ARM loans - "Pick-a-Pay" - which
permitted borrowers to choose the mortgage payment amount
each month (even allowing them to make payments so small that
they did not cover interest charges), with unpaid interest added
onto the mortgage and increasing its balance, not shrinking it as is
normally the case. 9 Golden West Financial's mortgage-related
problems led to Wachovia suffering write-downs and losses that
far exceeded the price it paid for the acquisition, with Wachovia
taking a 376% write-down as a percentage of earnings by early
October 2008.' 90 As a means to avoid serious adverse effects on
economic conditions and financial stability, Citigroup offered a bid
for Wachovia's banking operations in which it offered to pay about
$1 a share, or about $2.2 billion, for Wachovia's banking
operations in a deal brokered by the FDIC and which included a
commitment from the federal government to take losses above a
• 291
certain level on a large portfolio of Wachovia's risky loans. But
in an interesting turn of events, Wells Fargo came in with an
alternative bid for all of Wachovia's operations, including its
brokerage division, at a higher share price and without taxpayer
help. On October 12, 2008, the Federal Reserve approved Wells
Fargo's takeover, a deal that created the largest bank branch
network in the U.S.292 The merger ultimately closed on December
31, 2008, for a total purchase price of $12.68 billion.2 93
289. See David Enrich & Dennis K. Berman, Wachovia to Receive Big Infusion of
Capital, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at C1.
290. Story & Dash, supra note 5.
291. See Bernanke, supra note 242.
292. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Approval of
proposal by Wells Fargo & Company to acquire Wachovia Corporation (Oct. 12,
2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20081012
a.htm.
293. See Dan Fitzpatrick, Three Banks Complete Deals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009,
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Washington Mutual and Wachovia were the latest
casualties of a financial crisis that drove Lehman Brothers and
IndyMac Bank out of business and led to the hastily arranged
rescues of Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns. In response to the
crisis, the last large independent investment banks, Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, elected to become bank holding
companies in order to gain access to additional liquidity and
capital: 94
L The Credit Markets Freeze Up
As Wall Street banks faced waves of multibillion-dollar
losses, the crisis that began with subprime mortgages continued to
spread its way through the credit markets. Uncertainty over the
quantity and valuation of banks' "toxic assets" has meant that
many institutions could not count on loans from each other to
meet daily needs, and this illiquidity in the markets has impaired
their ability and willingness to lend. Among banks that had
leveraged their capital excessively through borrowing and other
financing devices, the mortgage-related losses wiped out much or
all of their capital, and this near-insolvency has dampened their
willingness to lend. Such factors undermined the strength of
otherwise sound financial institutions and prevented them from
financing productive loans, creating unwelcome effects on the
availability of credit and the value of savings. Excessively loose
monetary policy that helped to foster the credit bubble saw loans
made to not just subprime borrowers, but to all types of poor risks,
including overleveraged companies. Perhaps not surprisingly
given these other societal excesses, financial institutions also
borrowed too much as financial sector debt outstanding grew to
$16 trillion in 2007 from $10 trillion in 2002.295 Financial firms have
found it difficult or impossible to finance this overhang of
borrowing; this has caused many financial institutions to shrink or
at C3.
294. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Board
announces that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley transactions may be
consummated immediately (Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/press/orders/20080922a.htm.
295. See Hilsenrath et al., supra note 70.
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collapse. According to Peter Fisher, co-head of fixed income at
BlackRock, the asset-management firm, the current financial crisis
"is not just about homeowners defaulting on their mortgages," but
it is also about "financial institutions not being able to sustain their
296liabilities," given their sizeable overextension. If the banks are
not growing, then credit cannot see growth either. 97
This combination of factors led to a critical stage during the
fall of 2008 when the entire U.S. financial system was at risk. As a
result, the financial crisis began to affect the general availability of
credit to individuals, non-housing related businesses, and financial
institutions. Corporate bond and credit-default spreads witnessed
continued increases, industrial companies saw sharply reduced
access to all aspects of the bond market, the commercial paper
market became impaired, and companies with no direct
connection to the financial sector lost access to the credit markets
• . 291
needed to meet payrolls, pay suppliers, and purchase inventory.
Personal savings and retirement accounts have been threatened,
and the ability of consumers and businesses to borrow and finance
spending, investment, and job creation has been significantly
disrupted. While investors are hesitant to commit capital to
financial institutions because of this widespread uncertainty, it is
this investor confidence that is critical to restore needed liquidity
and enhance the stability of our financial system. The Federal
Reserve and Treasury Department expected the economy to
weaken but not as rapidly as it has, with declining consumer
confidence, falling home starts, slumping retail sales, and falling
industrial production. Consumers, who comprise seventy-two
percent of the U.S. economy, are pulling back on their spending
amidst a brutal tightening of credit conditions on everything from
car loans to credit cards and home equity loans.299
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Oversight of Implementation of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 and of Government Lending and Insurance Facilities; Impact on Economy
and Credit Availability: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong.
(2008) [hereinafter Hearing 8] (testimony by Henry M. Paulson Jr., U.S. Sec'y of the
Treas.).
299. See Guha, supra note 13.
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The deepening of the financial crisis also saw the inability
of businesses to issue commercial paper, the short-term debt
issued by banks, businesses, and municipalities to finance day-to-
day operations, to investors. These investors, after realizing that
some of the vehicles that had been issuing commercial paper might
also hold subprime assets, panicked and stopped purchasing
commercial paper, especially at longer-dated maturities. The
market for this kind of debt all but shut down, with many major
corporations unable to borrow for longer than a day at a time from
purchasers of commercial paper. Businesses were backed into a
wall as banks were not lending and purchasers of commercial
paper (institutional investors, financial institutions, and others)
were not making funds available by buying commercial paper.
The resulting severe credit contraction started to crimp working
capital and investment outlay at small businesses and had wider
effects on business activity through its impact on interest rates,
exchange rates, and consumer loans. This feedback chain
contributed to further layoffs and rising unemployment rates
across the economy.
To help alleviate this freeze and prevent substantial
disruptions to the economy, the Federal Reserve announced the
creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which
would serve to complement the Federal Reserve's existing credit
facilities to help provide liquidity to term funding markets.3°° By
purchasing commercial paper, in effect, the Federal Reserve
engaged itself in doing the lending that the private financial system
would not or could not do. "The CPFF will provide a liquidity
backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper through a special
purpose vehicle (SPV) that will purchase three-month unsecured
and asset-backed commercial paper directly from eligible
issuers.""3 1  While these moves have increased the amount of
taxpayer dollars at risk, it underscores the growing sense of
urgency felt by policymakers in a climate where lending had
virtually dried up. An improved commercial paper market is
300. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Board
announces creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to help
provide liquidity to term funding markets (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm.
301. See id.
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designed to enhance the ability of financial intermediaries to
accommodate the credit needs of businesses and households.
Severe redemption pressures since the financial crisis
deepened in September 2008 also forced money market funds to
raise cash by scaling back their short-term lending to banks and
selling their commercial paper holdings, making it difficult for
banks and companies to raise short-term funds. One of the safest
and, lately, most attractive places for people to place some of their
savings - the money market account - suddenly looked a little less
secure thanks to fallout from the mortgage debacle. The money
market funds confronted the same problems plaguing other
corners of the financial market. The Reserve Primary Fund, a
prominent fund, had placed some of its investors' money into $785
million of bonds issued by Lehman Brothers - investment bets that
looked much safer before Lehman entered into bankruptcy.
These circumstances led to this firm's net asset value to fall below
par - "breaking the buck" - for only the second time in history,
causing investors to begin to withdraw funds in large amounts
from money market mutual funds that invested in private
instruments such as commercial paper and certificates of deposit
and forcing more sales and pushing values down even further.0 2
Further panicked withdrawals occurred as fund managers
responded by liquidating assets and investing in only the shortest
of maturities. This precipitated "a $200 billion net outflow of funds
from that market."3 3 As the pace of withdrawals increased, both
the stability of the money market mutual fund industry and the
functioning of the commercial paper market were threatened. As
an additional intervention, the Federal Reserve indicated in late
October 2008 that it would finance up to $540 billion in purchases
of short-term debt from money market mutual funds'" In early
January 2009, the Federal Reserve announced two changes to the
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). °5  First,
302. See Kashkari, supra note 59.
303. See id.
304. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
announces the creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF)
(Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/mone
tary/20081021a.htm.
305. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
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eligibility to participate in the MMIFF was expanded from U.S.
money market mutual funds to also encompass a number of other
money market investors, including "U.S.-based securities-lending
cash-collateral reinvestment funds, portfolios, accounts (securities
lenders), and particular local government investment pools,
common trust funds, and collective investment funds that function
similar to money market funds."3 °6 Second, the Federal Reserve
adjusted "several of the MMIFF's economic parameters, including
the minimum yield on assets eligible to be sold to the MMIFF," so
that the program could remain a "viable source of backup liquidity
for money market investors even at very low money market
interest rates.,
30 7
In addition, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department
announced a substantial and aggressive lending program in late
November 2008. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF)3 °8 is a $200 billion program designed to keep credit
flowing freely from lenders to borrowers by lending money to
private investors who purchase securities backed by student loans,
auto loans, credit card debt, and small business loans guaranteed
by the Small Business Administration.09 To encourage investors
to start purchasing these securities backed by consumer debt or
business loans, the Federal Reserve has agreed to lend money at
attractive interest rates to them as well as provide an insurance
policy should loans underlying those investments default. The
Treasury will contribute $20 billion to TALF and assume
responsibility for any losses up to $20 billion, while the Federal
Reserve will lend no more than $180 billion. This marks the first
time that the Treasury and Federal Reserve have intervened to
announces changes to Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) (Jan. 7,
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/200901
07a.htm.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
announces the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
(Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/mone
tary/20081125a.htm.
309. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Provides TARP
Funds to Federal Reserve Consumer ABS Lending Facility (Nov. 25, 2008), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1292.htm.
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finance consumer debt.31°  Senior officials at the Treasury
Department and Federal Reserve remain confident that the rescue
plan for U.S. banks and the greater economy will succeed in
preventing a financial system meltdown and ensure that there will
not be another Great Depression, but they know that a "sharp
economic meltdown is already baked in the cake."3"' But, after
two decades in which economic growth has been fueled by
extraordinary surges of borrowed money, a new era of risk-
avoidance appears at hand.
J. Rising Unemployment and the Escalating Fear of Layoffs
Rising unemployment threatens to deepen the housing
slump, further depress mortgage debt, and increase delinquencies
on auto loans, credit cards, and other consumer loans. Economic
activity downshifted further in the wake of the deterioration in
financial markets in September 2008. The job losses since the
recession began totaled 2.59 million by mid-January 2009 - the
most since 1945-with the majority of layoffs and downsizing
occurring between September and December 2008 as consumers
and businesses cut back drastically. With the economy
deteriorating rapidly, the recession deepened even further during
December 2008 as 524,000 additional jobs were slashed, causing
the unemployment rate to reach its highest level in sixteen years."'
"Not since 1980 has the work force shrunk so much in just three
months. '3 14 As of mid-January 2009, the number of unemployed
Americans reached 11.1 million, a statistic almost fifty percent
bigger than at the start of the recession.315  The effects of the
financial crisis have spread well beyond Wall Street to other white-
310. See Andrews, supra note 10.
311. Guha, supra note 13.
312. See Kelly Evans & Kris Maher, Yearly Job Loss Worst Since 1945, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 10, 2009, at Al (noting that 1.9 million jobs were slashed in just the final four
months of the year); Louis Uchitelle, Jobless Rate Hits 7.2%, a 16-Year High, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at Al; see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors,
U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis, at the
Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin, Tex. (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2008l20la.htm.
313. Uchitelle, supra note 312.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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collar jobs such as lawyers and architects, as well as construction,
retail, and service jobs. The unemployment rate rose to 7.2% at
the beginning of January 2009.316 Long-term unemployment is a
worsening problem. Many Americans have been out of work for
months and have resorted to lower-wage or part-time jobs to make
ends meet.317 If those workers are included in the national labor
statistics, the so-called total unemployment rate rose to 13.5% in
January 2009, from just 8.7% at the start of the recession. 318 This
provides fresh evidence that the economic downturn accelerated
even further at the end of 2008, promising to make the current
recession, already in play since December 2007, the longest since
the Great Depression as households and businesses struggle with
the most financial stress they have faced in decades. The economy
will likely lose several hundred thousand more jobs a month well
into 2009, causing the unemployment rate, which was just five
percent as recently as April 2008, to hit eight percent or even
higher in the coming months.
VI. THE GENESIS OF THE "BAILOUT BILL"
A. Treasury Goes to Congress
Although the Federal Reserve saved A.I.G. with an
emergency loan the day after Lehman Brothers collapsed, the
credit markets around the world began freezing up anyway.
"Investors were stampeding out of money market mutual funds.
Credit markets were reeling, stocks were wobbling, and bank
failures loomed." '319 It was at this point that then-Treasury
Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., in consultation with Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, decided that he had to find a
systemic solution and stop jumping from crisis to crisis, fixing one
company's problems only to find several more right around the
corner. Although Paulson had been resisting such a move for
316. See U.S. Dep't of Labor Homepage, "Unemployment Rate" and "Payroll
Enrollment" Statistics, http://www.dol.gov/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
317. See Uchitelle, supra note 312.
318. Id.
319. Jon Hilsenrath, Deborah Solomon & Damian Paletta, Paulson, Bernanke
Strained for Consensus in Bailout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at Al.
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months, Bernanke suggested that it was time for the Treasury
secretary to go to Congress to seek funds and authority for a
broader rescue since the Federal Reserve had been stretched to its
limits and could not act any more forcefully or aggressively to
confront the financial crisis.
After continued signs of a dramatic slowdown, the federal
government announced a plan on September 20, 2008, called the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), to purchase large
amounts of illiquid, risky mortgage-backed securities from
financial institutions in order to restore the flow of necessary
lending and curtail the skyrocketing home foreclosures. Initially,
in late September, then-Secretary Paulson presented Congress
with a 2 -page draft to request authority to purchase $700 billion
worth of distressed assets, arguing that banks and other
institutions were suffering from the distressed assets clogging their
balance sheets. After a compromise was reached between
Congressional leaders and the Bush administration, the much
anticipated passage of the $700 billion bailout plan was initially
struck down by the U.S. House of Representatives in a 228-205
vote on September 29, 2008. Following this vote, the Dow Jones
dropped 778 points in a single day, its largest single-day point drop
ever, causing a $1.2 trillion loss in market value.3 2' Given these
circumstances, the U.S. Senate hastily added several sweeteners to
the legislation, including a provision that temporarily raises federal
insurance of bank accounts from $100,000 to $250,000 as a means
to protect more Americans from any potential bank runs, and
provided its support for the bill in a vote of 74-25 on October 1,
2008. Within a few days after the initial failed vote, Congress
recognized the great threat frozen credit markets posed to
Americans and the economy as a whole. On October 3, 2008,
upon Congress' passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (EESA), President Bush signed the bill, which had
321morphed into a 113-page monster, into law.
320. See Eric Martin, U.S. Stocks Plunge After House Votes Against Bailout Plan,
Sept. 29, 2008, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060108
7&refer=home&sid=aFVo3p8GzeWk.
321. See Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs H.R. 1424 Into Law
(Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/rel
eases/2008/10/20081003-17.html.
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B. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Reconsidered
But, even after Congress finally passed the bailout bill on
October 3, 2008, financial markets remained in turmoil. The crisis
began to spread to Europe and to emerging markets, with
governments acting quickly to stabilize banks, broaden guarantees
for deposits, and agree on a coordinated response. Banks in
England and Europe had also invested heavily in mortgage-backed
securities offered by Wall Street. Losses from those investments
and the effect of the same tightening credit spiral being felt on
Wall Street put a growing number of European institutions in
danger. The Dow Jones Index dropped further when markets
resumed trading during the week following the passage of the
bailout bill as stocks tumbled to record lows, ending one of the
worst weeks in the stock market since September 11, 2001.322 As
the financial markets spiraled further downward, a growing
number of top-tier financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley, became worried about their survival. As the
credit markets seized up and all but stopped functioning, many
companies found it impossible to borrow money on more than an
overnight basis. Bank stocks plummeted, making it much more
difficult to shore up their balance sheets by raising more capital
from investors. In this midst, the Treasury began "soliciting
feedback about capital injections from Wall Street executives,
• 323
hedge fund managers, and other" investors. And after a week in
which stocks declined almost twenty percent on Wall Street and a
meeting of the "Group of 7" countries-the United States, Britain,
Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan-European and
American officials announced coordinated actions that included
taking equity stakes in major banks, including $250 billion in initial
investments in the United States. 24 The government's equity
stakes in banks and bank holding companies involve the purchase
of preferred stock, which carries a significant required dividend.
322. See Alexandra Twin, Tough Day for Stocks, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 6, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/06/markets/markets-newyork/index.htm?postversion=
2008100610.
323. See Mark Landler, Rich Nations Pushing for Joint Financial Rescue, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at Al.
324. See id.
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In some ways, it mirrors long-term debt. Such actions here in the
United States intertwine the banking sector with the federal
government for years to come and give American taxpayers a
direct stake in the future of American banking and finance,
including any possible losses, however significant they may be.
The decision to take equity positions in U.S. banks also
represented a dramatic shift in the original purpose of the $700
billion financial rescue plan passed by Congress, as most had
expected the government to use the money primarily to purchase
troubled assets from financial institutions.325 "But, during the two
weeks that Congress considered the financial rescue legislation,
market conditions worsened considerably. By the time the bill was
signed on October 3, 2008, [then-] Secretary Paulson believed that
the federal government needed to act quickly and forcefully, and
that purchasing troubled assets - the initial focus - would take
time to implement and would not be sufficient given the
magnitude of the downturn." '326 The process of figuring out how to
purchase assets has proved tricky, in large part because it is
difficult to determine how to price such assets, many of which are
backed by risky mortgages and carry depressed values. Purchasing
them at market prices would further hurt banks, since the firms
would have to write-down the value of those assets. But, paying
above-market prices could hurt taxpayers if the assets never
recover in price. Nonetheless, Tim Ryan, president of the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and the
former head of the Resolution Trust Corporation which worked to
resolve the Savings and Loan Crisis in the 1980s, believes that
plans for the U.S. government to purchase troubled assets as part
of its financial rescue package should not be delayed or
abandoned. 2  Ryan is a "big believer in government establishing
325. See, e.g., Henry M. Paulson Jr., Fighting the Financial Crisis, One Challenge at
a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A27 (stating that Treasury's initial intent "was
to strengthen the banking system by purchasing illiquid mortgages and mortgage-
related securities"); Mark Gongloff, Bailout Recipe Should Include a Grain of Salt,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2008, at C1 (noting that Secretary Paulson marketed TARP as
a "clearinghouse for toxic credit assets such as mortgage-backed securities").
326. See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on
Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1265.htm.
327. See Krishna Guha, Buying of US toxic assets urged,' FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2008.
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the market clearing price for these assets because nobody else is
doing it. 3 28 Ryan originally thought that the government would
purchase assets to establish prices and determine the size of the
hole in banks' balance sheets before trying to fill that hole with
new capital, since institutions holding illiquid assets still do not
know how large their losses may be.329 According to this line of
thinking, as long as banks remain unsure about their asset
valuations, capital injections would have, at best, a limited impact
on their desire to extend credit.33° The continued presence of these
distressed assets leads to increased "uncertainty about the
underlying value of these institutions and [inhibits] both new
private investment and new lending."33' As the financial crisis
continues, there is increasing fear of corporate bankruptcies that
will both strain banks' balance sheets and make them even more
hesitant to make loans that could help keep struggling companies
alive.
Then-Treasury Secretary Paulson announced in mid-
November 2008 that the Treasury has placed on hold its plan to
purchase illiquid mortgage-related assets-the original intention of
the $700 billion rescue plan.332 Instead, Treasury continued
focusing its efforts on injecting capital directly into the financial
sector. In detailing the next phase of Treasury's Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), Treasury has considered a proposal to
require that firms seeking future government capital assistance
raise private capital in order to qualify for public assistance,
according to people familiar with the matter."' Additionally, a
new set of guidelines issued in mid-November 2008 by the Federal
Reserve and other federal banking regulators called for every
banking organization to "ensure the adequacy of its capital base,
engage in appropriate loss mitigation strategies and foreclosure
328. Id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Crisis and the Policy Response, Remarks at the Stamp Lecture, London School of
Economics, London, England (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090ll3a.htm.
332. Paulson, supra note 326.
333. See id.
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prevention, and reassess the incentive implications of its
compensation policies" in order to strengthen the capital base of
the financial system and restore liquidity to credit markets.334
These policy changes are designed to address the critical issue of
making sure that banks continue to lend at adequate levels by
making new capital widely available to U.S. financial institutions,
broadening and increasing the guarantees on bank deposit
accounts and certain liabilities, and providing backup liquidity to
U.S. banking organizations.335
Notwithstanding trillions of dollars of taxpayer infusions
from the federal government and other governmental
interventions, credit is still not flowing at the level many had
desired or anticipated. Because banks are playing defensively,
they are doing whatever they can to protect their assets, causing
them to not want to produce any new loans. "While banking
regulators are urging banks to issue loans, they are also requiring
that they reduce the amount of money they seek to borrow.
33 6
Bank holdings of cash nearly tripled to a little over $1 trillion
between October and December 2008, according to Federal
337Reserve data. Credit card lenders are adjusting to a new
regulatory landscape which, the industry argues, will restrict credit
at a time when consumers are in dire need of just that.338 In the
capital markets, bond investors have abandoned all but the least
risky of investments, and the rush to purchase conservative U.S.
Treasury securities has pushed the yields on these investments to
historic lOWS. 39  Investors and bankers will remain wary of
extending credit until the housing market stabilizes and until job
layoffs start to slow as more people find jobs and get back to work,
for "[i]n a struggling economy, even a seemingly solid loan can
334. Interagency Statement on Meeting the Needs of Creditworthy Borrowers,
Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, (Nov. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO81l5.htmi.
335. Id.
336. Eric Dash & Vikas Bajaj, In 2009, Economy Will Depend on Unlocking
Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B1.
337. See id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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turn bad quickly.""34  When the credit markets regain stability,
bankers hope investors will start purchasing other types of debt,
helping to unfreeze credit flows. 4 1 As a move designed to help
boost lending and jumpstart the economy, the FDIC in mid-
January 2009 announced plans to expand its Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program, its debt-guarantee program, to back debt
with maturities of up to ten years (previously, the FDIC backed
debt with maturities no more than three-years), provided that the
debt is backed by collateral and will help support new consumer
lending.342
The worsening of economic growth prospects, the
continuation of credit losses and asset markdowns, and the
significant quantity of distressed, difficult-to-value mortgage assets
on institutions' balance sheets create the strong possibility that
more capital injections and guarantees may be needed to ensure
stability and the normalization of credit markets, even if the
Obama administration passes its much anticipated economic
stimulus package.343  Many institutions, including Citigroup,
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, each expect
further substantial losses as their finances keep deteriorating as the
economy continues to weaken.344 Additional losses were expected
to pile up even further from loans made to commercial real estate
developers, small businesses, and highly leveraged corporate
buyouts, as well as from consumers who continue to default on
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), Treasury, Federal
Reserve and the FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/prO9OO4.html.
343. See Bernanke, supra note 331; Priorities for the Next Administration: Use of
TARP Funds Under EESA: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th
Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Hearing 9] (testimony of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman,
Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.) (noting that financial institutions are still
"clogged" by hard-to-sell assets and still need help).
344. See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced & Eric Dash, JPMorgan Reports Slim Profit
in Tough Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
01/16/business/16bank.html?_r=l&ref=business (noting that JPMorgan Chase, which
reported a $702 million profit for its 2008 fourth quarter (far short of the nearly $3
billion it earned for the same quarter in 2007), posted more than $2.8 billion in losses
on a range of business, from trading and corporate lending to credit card and
mortgage lending).
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their mortgages, credit cards, and auto loans. 345 Bank of America,
which had already received $25 billion in TARP funds, entered
into discussions with the Treasury Department in mid-December
2008 after it notified the Treasury Department that it was unlikely
to complete its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, concerned that its
capital base could not support Merrill's troubled assets as a result
of Merrill's larger-than-anticipated losses in the fourth quarter
46
related to CDOs, subprime MBSs, commercial real estate, and
other credit assets.3 47 The Treasury Department, concerned about
the consequences of the deal's failure on U.S. financial markets
and global economic stability, agreed to commit $20 billion in
additional capital to Bank America in exchange for Bank of
America's acquisition of Merrill Lynch - a plan announced with
the release of Bank of America's fourth quarter earnings report (a
loss of $1.79 billion) on January 16, 2009.348 In addition to the
capital injection, the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and
FDIC were working on an asset-guarantee plan patterned after the
Citigroup rescue. Under the terms, the Treasury Department and
FDIC will also backstop most future losses from a pool of $118
billion in troubled assets, including residential and commercial real
estate and corporate loans, which will remain on the bank's
balance sheet.349 In exchange, Bank of America will provide the
federal government with an additional $4 billion stake in preferred
stock.350
The landscape of our nation's economy has been radically
reshaped by the federal government in a very short period and in a
seemingly ad hoc manner, as then-Treasury Secretary Paulson
suggested on several occasions that there is "no playbook" for
345. Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Banks in Need of Even More Bailout
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at Al.
346. Merrill Lynch incurred a $15.3 billion loss for the fourth quarter after
additional write-downs related to distressed assets.
347. See Dan Fitzpatrick, Damian Paletta & Susanne Craig, U.S. Negotiating More
Aid for Bank of America, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.comarticle/
SB123197132814683053.html?mod=testMod; see also Julie Creswell, Bank of
America May Receive More Bailout Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at B1.
348. Louise Story, Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bank of America Posts Loss
as It Gets New Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/17/
business/17bofa.html?hp.
349. See Press Release, supra note 342.
350. See id.
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dealing with the current financial crisis. Now, after spending
hundreds of billions more to prop up, bail out, and wind down a
multitude of institutions, the U.S. government effectively runs,
supports, or outright owns vast portions of the financial sector.
Senior government officials have consistently reassured both
Congress and the American public that these measures should
help rebuild confidence in the financial system, increase the
liquidity of financial markets, and improve the ability of financial
institutions to raise capital from private sources.351 To prove the
truth of the phrase "time is of the essence," then-Treasury
Secretary Paulson stated that only now that the bailout bill has
been enacted into law does the federal government have the
authority to intervene in a nonbank failure in cases of firms that
lack adequate collateral, as was the case with Lehman Brothers.
C. Help! Growing Calls for Governmental Assistance
The U.S. government's financial system rescue plans have
come under increasing pressure as a growing array of distressed
companies have signaled the need for financial assistance. As
another illustration of the stress on financial services companies,
American Express Co. won swift approval from the Federal
Reserve in early November 2008 to become a bank holding
company, helping the credit card company gain access to some of
the $700 billion in federal TARP funds being injected into
financial firms.353 The structural switch shows how financial
services firms that have long relied on the capital markets are
acting quickly and forcefully to shore up their funding sources as
the credit crisis drags on and economic turmoil spreads around the
globe. General Motors Corp., which lobbied heavily for
government financial aid, indicated that it might violate the terms
351. See Hearing 8, supra note 298 (testimony of Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed.
Reserve Sys., Stabilizing the Financial Markets and the Economy, at the Economic
Club of New York, N.Y. (Oct. 15, 2008).
352. See Nocera & Andrews, supra note 248.
353. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Approval of
proposal by American Express Company and American Express Travel Related
Services Company to become bank holding companies (Nov. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20081110a.htm.
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of some of its debt and even face bankruptcy if it cannot regain a
steady financial footing. While Congress refused to open TARP
funds to U.S. automakers, the Bush administration, as one of its
parting gifts, granted an emergency bailout of General Motors and
Chrysler in mid-December 2008. 354 While the plan provided $13.4
billion by mid-January 2009 into the companies from TARP funds,
the two companies have until March 31, 2009 to produce a plan for
long-term profitability, including concessions from unions,
creditors, suppliers and dealers.355 In February 2009, another $4
billion was scheduled to be made available for General Motors if
the rest of the $700 billion bailout package had been released by
Congress.356 Mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posted
losses of $29 billion and $25.3 billion, respectively, in the third
quarter of 2008. While Fannie Mae indicated that it would likely
ask for a cash infusion from the Treasury Department's special
$200 billion pool set aside back in September to aid the companies
before 2008 came to a close, Freddie Mac had in fact asked for an
initial injection of $13.8 billion in government assistance.
About a week before Obama assumed the presidency, he
requested that President Bush ask Congress to release the
remaining $350 billion TARP funds, on his behalf. On January 15,
2009, the U.S. Senate voted to release the TARP fund's remaining
$350 billion to the Treasury Department, in a close vote (58 to 42)
that provided a clear indication of lawmakers' deep uncertainty
about the program. While members of the U.S. House of
Representatives seemed to be even more skeptical of the release
of the remaining TARP funds, under the original TARP
legislation, only one chamber's support was required in order for
the Treasury to access the funds.357 President Obama and his
354. See Fact Sheet: Financing Assistance to Facilitate the Restructuring of Auto
Manufacturers to Attain Financial Viability (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/18070/factsheet.html.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 115(c) (2008). Unless Congress passes a joint
resolution rejecting the request within fifteen days after receipt, the Treasury
Department can begin to tap the funds. If Congress turns down the request, the
president could veto the resolution and then the Treasury Department could
proceed. The money would then be blocked only if Congress overrides the veto,
which would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Given that the Senate
offered its vote of approval, even if the House of Representatives voted to reject the
[Vol. 13
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
leading economic advisers assured Congress that they would use a
substantial portion of the second half of the TARP funds to help
distressed homeowners refinance mortgages and escape
foreclosure.358 With the release of the second half of the TARP
funds, it seems that President Obama managed to avoid a dramatic
showdown over the specifics on how the money will be disbursed,
given the continued unraveling of different sectors of the economy
and congressional criticism of federal bailout efforts under the
outgoing Bush administration. Government officials and
policymakers were also looking at reviving the original idea of
TARP - to have Treasury buy up distressed mortgage-related
assets from financial entities.9 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke, however, sharply warned President Obama and
Congressional leaders that the second half of the TARP funds -
and possibly more - needs to be dedicated to recapitalizing banks
so that they can resume lending at normal levels.
D. Third Time the Charm? The Rescue of Citigroup
Despite the passage of the monstrous $700 billion bailout
bill, the financial crisis appeared to be entering another
treacherous phase by late November 2008. While federal
government regulators had developed two sweeping plans to bail
out banking institutions earlier in 2008, investors remained
skeptical after both occasions. In fact, the $25 billion that the
federal government invested in Citigroup this fall through TARP
funds did not appear sufficient to stabilize it. Citigroup, once the
nation's largest financial institution, faced over $65 billion in
losses, write-downs for troubled assets, and charges to account for
future additional losses, with over half of that amount a result of1 61
plummeting mortgage-related securities. Citigroup suffered four
request, the point is moot because the law requires action by both chambers to block
the funds, making a joint resolution infeasible.
358. See Andrews & Dash, supra note 345 (noting that Lawrence H. Summers,
head of the White House National Economic Council, reiterated that the Obama
administration would use some of the funds to help reduce foreclosures).
359. See Bernanke, supra note 331; Hearing 9, supra note 343 (testimony of
Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys.).
360. See Bernanke, supra note 331.
361. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 213.
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consecutive quarters of multibillion-dollar losses after writing
down billions of dollars of mortgage-related investments.362
Citigroup hoped to be able to unload some of those troubled
mortgage-related assets to the U.S. government through its
Troubled Asset Relief Program, until then-Treasury Secretary
Paulson effectively withdrew plans to use TARP funds to purchase
banks' bad assets.3 63  Accordingly, Citigroup went ahead and
announced plans to sell about $80 billion in risky assets and
purchase $17.4 billion in assets from its structured-investment
vehicles - including risky mortgage-related securities - and faced a
364$1.1 billion loss because of their sharply reduced values. As a
result of these factors, Citigroup's market capitalization valuation
fell to $20.5 billion on Friday, November 21, 2008, a sharp decline
from its $244 billion value just two years ago, and still retained $20
billion of mortgage-related securities on its books, most of which
have been marked down to between 21 and 41 cents on the
dollar.6 ' The plunge in the company's stock price threatened the
viability of other financial institutions since Citigroup retained
more than $2 trillion in assets and operations in over one hundred
countries.366
Only a matter of days after then-Treasury Secretary
Paulson indicated that the government bailouts had stabilized the
most important financial institutions, Citigroup's plunging stock
prices forced the federal government to intervene once again.
Under the agreement reached in late November 2008, Citigroup
and government regulators will back up to $306 billion of largely
residential and commercial real estate loans and other assets,
161which will remain on the bank's balance sheet. Citigroup will
362. See id.
363. See David Enrich, Carrick Mollenkamp, Matthias Rieker, Damian Paletta &
Jon Hilsenrath, U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122747680752551447.html.
364. See id.
365. See Dash & Creswell, supra note 213.
366. See Eric Dash, U.S. Approves Plan to Help Citigroup Cope With Losses, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
367. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury,
Federal Reserve and the FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1287.htm.
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shoulder losses on the first $29 billion of that portfolio.368 The
government will also inject an additional $20 billion into Citigroup,
in addition to the $25 billion it invested a few weeks ago through
TARP funds.3 9  Any remaining losses will be split between
Citigroup and the government, with the bank absorbing ten
percent and the government absorbing ninety percent.370 Under
the plan, the government would virtually insure a portion of
Citigroup's balance sheet, meaning that taxpayers will be
responsible if Citigroup's large portfolios of mortgage, credit
cards, commercial real estate, and large corporate loans continue
to weaken. This second bailout effort by the federal government
placed Citigroup under open bank assistance, "which involves a
loss-sharing arrangement devised by the [FDIC] and an
investment by the Treasury typically reserved for deeply troubled
institutions." '371 This new bailout program suggests yet another
phase in government efforts to stabilize the economy and financial
markets, as senior government officials now seem "willing to help
shoulder bad assets, on a targeted basis, from specific
institutions.
372
By early 2009, Citigroup, which had already received a $45
billion bailout package from the Treasury, remained in extremely
dire straits. Investors and regulators from the Federal Reserve
and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency pushed it to
downsize in the face of its fifth straight quarter of losses, with a
fourth quarter 2008 operating loss of $8.29 billion and a total
yearly loss for 2008 of $18.72 billion.3 The company announced
that it will reorganize into two business lines focused on banking
(Citicorp) and other asset management and consumer financial
services (Citi Holdings), and will combine its Smith Barney
brokerage unit with Morgan Stanley's brokers, establishing the
368. See Term Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.us
treas.gov/press/releases/reports/cititermsheet-l12308.pdf.
369. See Press Release, supra note 367.
370. See Term Sheet, supra note 368.
371. See Eric Dash, Citigroup Reports Big Loss and a Breakup Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2009, at B8.
372. Enrich et al., supra note 363.
373. See Dash, supra note 371.
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world's largest brokerage. While the company will focus its
attention on its strongest remaining businesses, it plans to close
some of its money-losing business operations, including its
consumer finance operations, private-label credit card businesses,
Primerica insurance unit, proprietary trading, alternative
investment division, and sell its overseas brokerage and asset
management units.375 The newly announced strategy represents the
abandonment of the acquisition-fueled growth strategy that built
Citigroup into a "one-stop shop" in 1998 with the merger of
Travelers Group, the insurance company, and Citicorp, the
nation's largest bank at the time, that brought together banking,
376insurance, and underwriting operations. It also stands as a
glaring example of how the banking system is in dire need of even
more monetary assistance.
VII. RESTORING THE ECONOMY AND STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL
MARKETS
A. Efforts to Stimulate Economic Growth and Prevent Further
Deterioration
In an interview on NBC's "Meet the Press" aired on
December 7, 2008, then-President-elect Barack Obama indicated
that the economy seems destined to get worse before it gets better
but pledged a recovery plan" that is equal to the task ahead." In
early December, Obama, whose economic advisers were already
hard at work on an economic recovery package, announced that he
intends to revive the economy through a job-creating public works
program of a scope not seen since the development of the
interstate highway system in the 1950s. Such measures, along with
proposed tax cuts and increased commitments to social benefit
programs such as unemployment insurance, Medicaid, and an
education stabilization fund to avoid cut backs in teachers and
classroom programs, are an integral part of his vision for a massive
economic recovery plan. Continued dismal employment reports
374. See id.; David Enrich, Citi Logs $8.3 Billion Loss, Outlines Split, WALL ST. J.,
Jan 17, 2009, at B3.
375. See Dash, supra note 371.
376. See Dash, supra note 371.
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increased the likelihood that Congress will approve such an
economic recovery package, a two-year economic stimulus that has
grown to approximately $800 billion. The deepening financial
crisis has demonstrated that stabilizing our financial system will
require not only strengthening our financial institutions so they are
able to lend to our communities, but also helping homeowners
avoid preventable foreclosures. Regrettably, there are many
American families in these dire circumstances. The housing crisis
continues to provide enormous challenges for America, especially
given that there is no "silver bullet" solution. As an additional
piece of his short-term economic agenda, President Obama has
also advocated an effort to stem the rising tide of foreclosures,
likely led by the FDIC, which pressed the outgoing Bush
administration for months to approve such a plan.
The outgoing Bush administration urged lenders to ease
the burden of struggling U.S. homeowners and avoid taking over
thousands of homes. As part of a deal with several state attorneys
general to resolve claims against Countrywide, the mortgage
lender acquired by Bank of America earlier this year, Bank of
America is working to modify troubled mortgages for almost
400,000 borrowers with home loans from Countrywide. In mid-
January 2009, the bank reiterated that it is in the process of
working to prevent hundreds of thousands of mortgage borrowers
from entering into foreclosure, and hopes to keep 630,000
homeowners in their homes.377 The FDIC has reached out to
financially strapped borrowers whose mortgages were serviced by
IndyMac Bank. Wachovia initiated a loan-refinancing program
before agreeing to its pending takeover by Wells Fargo.
JPMorgan Chase, with a mortgage modification plan that has
already prevented over 300,000 foreclosures, has indicated that it
plans to amend and expand its program by helping another 300,000
families remain in their homes with mortgage modifications over
the next two years and not placing any loans into foreclosure.
Citigroup has offered to modify the terms of as much as $20 billion
377. See Suzanne Craig & Dan Fitzpatrick, Bank of America Goes on Offense,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2009, at B3.
378. See Kerry E. Grace, J.P. Morgan Stays in Black, but Calls Results 'Very
Disappointing,' WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.grubbellis-ny.com/2009
Articles/1-15-08/WSJ%20-%20J.P. %20Morgan%20Stays%20in%20Black.pdf.
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in mortgages for borrowers who are current on their loan
payments but at risk of falling behind. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and U.S. officials also announced plans to speed up the
modification of hundreds of thousands of loans held by the
housing finance giants, marking the latest effort to try and prevent
more foreclosures. Yet while this plan could cause lower monthly
payments for several hundred thousand homeowners, "it would
have virtually no impact on the millions of people who took out
expensive subprime loans and who are at the heart of the nation's
foreclosure crisis.""' As a result, Barney Frank (D-MA),
chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, would like
to see more TARP funds used to help homeowners.3 0 The Obama
administration is still discussing a range of other, more extensive
options to help homeowners.
While such measures will help keep some borrowers in
their homes, they will not be enough to stem the rising tide of
foreclosures, according to Mark Zandi, chief economist of
Moody's Economy.com.38' "The foreclosure crisis is now much too
large to be sufficiently addressed by mortgage servicers and
owners, he said."' "The federal government will need to come
forward with a very large and comprehensive foreclosure-
mitigation plan., 383  Across the United States, 8.5 million
homeowners are expected to default on their mortgages between
2008 and 2010, with some 5.2 million of them expected to lose their
homes.384 However, finding troubled homeowners, modifying their
mortgages, and keeping them in their homes is easier said than
done. It is much more difficult to restructure mortgages bundled
and packaged into securities that now are owned by investors with
divergent interests. 8 ' Financial executives have competing views
on whether mortgages that were securitized can be modified since
379. Edmund L. Andrews, White House Scales Back A Mortgage Relief Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at B1.
380. See id.
381. Ruth Simon, Citi to Modify Terms for U.S. Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2008, at C2.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See id.
385. See, e.g., Louise Story, Lawmakers Debate Pitfalls of Loan Modification, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at B3.
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they are not owned by the banks that serviced them, but instead by
• . 386
numerous investors. Some contracts underlying securitizations
expressly prohibit any modifications to the underlying mortgages,
and some industry experts are inclined to believe that investors
may sue any banks that change mortgages.18' For instance, some
securitization agreements limit the percentage of loans modified to
between five and ten percent of the original value of all
outstanding loans while others require the consent of the ratings
agency, the bond insurer, and guarantors or entities providing
credit enhancement before restructuring.3'8
Government officials have also come under increasing
pressure to address falling home prices and rising foreclosures,
which underpin the financial crisis. Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben S. Bernanke has urged the federal government to consider
sweeping steps to prevent foreclosures, including buying risky
mortgages and refinancing them under more favorable terms to
homeowners. In a new federal government initiative aimed at
pushing down home mortgage rates announced in November 2008,
the Federal Reserve will purchase $600 billion of mortgage-backed
securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and other
government-controlled financing entities.3 9  With increased
demand for both debt-and mortgage-backed securities, the value
of those investments should rise, helping to lower both their yields
and mortgage rates. This program, coupled with other recent
federal government initiatives discussed above, demonstrates that
the federal government will print as much money as necessary in
order to rehabilitate the nation's banking system, lending,
386. See id.
387. See id.
388. See Brescia, supra note 38, at 299 (noting that because most securitization
conduits are created as Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs), such
entities are then excluded from taxation but in order to qualify for such tax benefits,
the loan pool must remain static and loan modifications can only be conducted if
default under the loan is reasonably foreseeable; no modifications can occur in
anticipation of default).
389. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors, U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
announces it will initiate a program to purchase the direct obligations of housing-
related government-sponsored enterprises and mortgage-backed securities backed by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm; Andrews, supra note
10.
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consumer spending, home buying, and investment. The Treasury
Department is also considering a plan to revitalize the U.S.
housing market that would lower interest rates for home mortgage
loans. The plan, still in the early stages, would use the clout of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on a temporary basis to encourage
banks to issue new mortgages at rates as low as 4.5% by having
Treasury purchase securities underpinning the loans at a price
equivalent to that rate.39° Treasury believes that this plan could
halt the persistent slide in housing prices by enabling borrowers to
afford larger loans, thus increasing demand and pushing up home
values.391  The lower interest rates would only be available to
borrowers who are purchasing a home and not for refinancing
purposes. Christopher Mayer, a professor at Columbia
University's Business School, estimates that this plan could quickly
help 1.5 million to 2.5 million people purchase homes, providing a
392
significant boost to the housing market and greater economy.
While the government would serve as the guaranteed buyer, banks
and financial institutions could also benefit by generating fees for
procuring loans to home buyers able to afford homes at the new
lower rates. Such measures could further boost the economy and
improve the market for other consumer loans that have weighed
heavily on the banking industry.
B. Lax Regulation and the Realities of a New Finance
Regulatory Landscape
As a result of this financial crisis, an expansion of the
government's role in financial markets is certain. The housing
correction has exposed alarming shortcomings in the outdated
U.S. regulatory system. Our financial system was undermined not
only by greed and other bad behavior, but by an utter lack of
checks and balances to curb such destructive forces. For one, a
lingering question remains why banking regulators failed to
respond more quickly to curb the growth in risky home loans to
390. See Deborah Solomon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Eyes Plan to Lift Home Sales,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at Al.
391. See id.
392. See id.
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people with weak credit. As Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT),
chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, has said, "[i]t seems quite apparent that the
regulators were asleep at the switch."'3 93 Other recent events in the
financial sector, including the Bernard Madoff $50 billion fraud
scandal, have indicated that regulatory agencies such as the SEC
have been negligent in taking care of some of their most critical
regulatory responsibilities.
In the longer term, it is clear that our current economic
circumstances demand that we rethink, reform, and modernize
supervision of the financial services industry. In September 2008,
President Bush stated that "[o]nce this crisis is resolved, there will
be time to update our financial regulatory structures. Our 21st
century global economy remains regulated largely by outdated
20th century laws. Recently, we've seen how one company can
grow so large that its failure jeopardizes the entire financial
system."3 94 According to Charles L. Evans, the president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the financial crisis has revealed
"significant weaknesses" in the U.S. regulatory system that must
be addressed on multiple levels as the current "patchwork of
regulatory authorities failed to curb excessive risk-taking or detect
systemic vulnerabilities."'3 95 Indeed, even then-Treasury Secretary
Paulson acknowledged in early 2008 that our current regulatory
structure was not built to address the modern financial system with
its broad array of market participants, innovation and ingenuity,
complexity of financial instruments and financial engineering,
convergence of financial intermediaries and trading platforms, and
global integration of financial institutions, investors, and
markets.396  Moreover, our financial services companies have
393. See Vikas Bajaj, Senate Questioning on Mortgages Puts Regulators on the
Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at C4.
394. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President's Address to the Nation
(Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://www.clipsandcomment.com/2008/09/24/transcript-
president-bush-address-to-nation-on-us-financial-crisis-september-24-2008/.
395. Charles L. Evans, President & Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Remarks Before the Allied Social Sciences Associations, San Francisco, CA
(Jan. 3, 2009), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/news-room/speeches/2009_0
1 03.NABE-speech.cfm.
396. See Henry M. Paulson Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on
Blueprint for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.
gov/press/releases/hp897.htm.
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become substantially larger, more complex, and more difficult to
supervise and manage. In our current regulatory scheme, we have
five federal deposit institution regulators in addition to state-based
supervision, we bifurcate securities and futures regulation, and
insurance regulation, one of the largest financial services
industries, is almost entirely conducted at the state level.397 While
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the last comprehensive
financial regulatory overhaul in the United States, made
substantial and important changes to our financial regulatory
structure by allowing broader affiliations of financial services
firms, it has also maintained separate and distinct regulatory
agencies across the traditional securities, futures, insurance, and
banking industry segments.398 This regulatory structure is not only
at odds with the "increasing convergence of financial service
providers and products," but it can allow significant regulatory
matters, such as the various financial innovations which
precipitated the financial crisis, to "fall through the cracks."3 9
In March 2008, then-Treasury Secretary Paulson also laid
out a "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory
Structure, ' '400 in which he recommended a United States regulatory
model based on objectives that more closely link the regulatory
structure to the reasons why regulation exists in the first place. His
model proposes three primary regulators: one focused on market
stability across the entire financial sector, another focused on the
safety and soundness of institutions supported by a federal
guarantee, and a third focused on protecting consumers and
401investors. While Americans have come to expect the Federal
Reserve to step in to avert events that pose unacceptable systemic
risk, it does not have the clear statutory authority or the mandate
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. See id.; Bernanke, supra note 331 (stating that "[w]e need stronger
supervisory and regulatory systems under which gaps and unnecessary duplication in
coverage are eliminated, lines of supervisory authority and responsibility are
clarified, and oversight powers are adequate to curb excessive leverage and risk-
taking").
400. See generally Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure,
http:/lwww.ustreas.govlpresslreleaseslreportslBlueprint.pdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2009).
401. See id.
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to do this.402  Therefore, Paulson emphasized that we should
consider how to most appropriately give the Federal Reserve the
authority to access necessary information from complex financial
institutions - commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, or
other types of financial institutions - and the tools needed to
401intervene to mitigate systemic risk in advance of a crisis.
Since then-Secretary Paulson and the Treasury Department
released the Blueprint, the collapse of a number of storied
investment banks and financial institutions and the market turmoil
more generally have placed in stark relief the outdated nature of
our financial regulatory system. The financial crisis has indicated,
with much drama, that this nation must move very quickly to
update its regulatory structure and improve both market oversight
and market discipline. President Barack Obama and senior
Congressional leaders including Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-
CT), the Senate Banking Committee chairman, and
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), the House Financial
Services Committee chairman, have indicated that they would go
even further than the proposals issued by the outgoing Bush
administration. 4  Among their objectives, they seek to overhaul
and consolidate the current financial system, including a possible
merger of the SEC and the CFTC, in order to eliminate
overlapping regulatory agencies, give other agencies new powers,
expand financial oversight beyond the banking industry, and
create a new overseer for the overall system.405
402. See Systemic Risk and the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the H. R. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 9 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing 10] (testimony of Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
403. See id.
404. During her confirmation hearing before the Senate banking panel on January
13, 2009, Mary L. Schapiro, President Barack Obama's choice to lead the Securities
and Exchange Commission, noted that "[t]here are many reasons for this crisis - and
one of them is that our regulatory system has not kept pace with the markets and the
needs of investors. It is precisely during times like that that we need [the SEC to be]
the investor's advocate - that has the staff, the will and the resources necessary to
move with great urgency to bring transparency and accountability to all corners of
the marketplace, to vigorously prosecute those who have broken the law and cheated
investors, and to modernize our country's regulatory system to match the realities of
today's global, interdependent markets." Statement of Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman-Designate Mary Schapiro (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://
banking.senate.gov/public/_files/SchapiroFINALtestimonyll509.pdf.
405. See Jonathan Weisman, Obama Keen to Regulate Finance, WALL ST. J., Dec.
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Financial institutions are also likely to face tougher rules on
maintaining capital reserves and liquidity. Unregulated companies
and instruments such as derivatives, hedge funds, mortgage
brokers, and credit rating agencies - all implicated in the current
crisis - might be brought under the government's thumb. As the
crisis on Wall Street, and Main Street, has deepened,
Representative Frank believes that our nation needs new
regulations that take into account, for instance, the enormous rise
in lending - largely unregulated - that takes place outside the
banking system, and that can better monitor the huge risks many
Wall Street firms now take in the course of doing "u4e 6
Representative Frank has also proposed ambitious ideas, including
the creation of "a financial services system risk regulator," with the
power "to assess risk across financial markets regardless of
corporate form and to intervene when appropriate" such as
mandating leverage reductions or capital requirement increases.407
Representative Frank predicts that 2009 will be the "best year" in
terms of public policy since the New Deal era.4 8 Mr. Frank has
also said that Congress' short-term goals include passing a
regulatory overhaul comparable in scope to the development of
the antitrust laws of the late nineteenth century and the creation of
the SEC during the New Deal, with the overall objective to reduce
excessive risk-taking within the general contexts of investor and
consumer protections and mortgage lending.409
C. Efforts to Strengthen Global Coordination
International leaders recently attended an emergency
summit meeting held in Washington, D.C. to discuss coordinated
actions to deal with the financial crisis. The leaders of these
twenty countries, the "G-20," agreed to work more closely to
reinvigorate their economies but put on hold the complex
19, 2008, at A4.
406. See Joe Nocera, A System Overdue for Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/O3/29/business/29nocera.html.
407. Id.
408. See Jessica Holzer, Frank Foresees Sweeping Regulatory Overhaul, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 4, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122842202149980375.html.
409. See id.
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questions of how to overhaul and financial regulation and
coordinate international actions until they hold their next
economic summit in April 2009. The G-20 members pledged
new efforts to strengthen supervision of banks and credit rating
agencies, scrutinize executive pay, and increase regulation of
complex derivatives, a significant factor in recent market
turmoil .41
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have not seen a period as wrenching as this in many a
decade. The many events of this financial crisis provide a superb
illustration of how the U.S. financial system has had to digest a
tremendous amount of direct blows in just a few months' time.
Hundreds of years of investment banking history had weathered
the chaos of stock market crashes, the Great Depression, two
world wars and several domestic recessions and international
currency crises. Yet, it took a made-in-America mortgage market
implosion to dismantle three of the five most distinguished
independent investment banks - Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, and Bear Stearns - in just six months.
The financial crisis will likely take many months to
dissipate. The excesses in our society built up over many years,
and it will take time and patience to work through the unwinding
of tremendous amounts of leveraging by consumers and
companies. The road ahead for the U.S. economy and the global
economy is full of challenges. Given the financial damage to date,
a significant rise in layoffs and unemployment coupled with
reduced consumer spending seem inevitable. While leading
experts assure that this crisis will pass and that the United States
will end up with a "far sounder financial system" as a result, it will
• 1 412
not come quickly. A necessary condition for this crisis to end is a
410. See Mark Landler, World Leaders Vow Joint Push to Aid Economy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at Al.
411. See id.
412. See Sudeep Reddy & Kara Scannell, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile
House Panel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at Al.
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
stabilization of home prices in the United States, which many
economists predict might come as early as mid- or late 2009.413
As the days and weeks pass and the economic crisis
deepens, consumers' options are constrained, causing their
personal version of the American dream to disappear. Most of us
know people who were laid off and are looking for work, who are
worried because the financial crisis has afflicted their personal
savings, and who are worried that sometime soon, they will be
joining the unemployment lines. It is easy to despair, but
remember that financial markets are cyclical - financial turmoil
seems to occur every five to ten years - and that "the bigger the
binge, the worse the hangover. 4 14 The current financial crisis
should be recognized as a necessary but painful market correction
following the huge increase in the U.S. mortgage origination
volume from 2001 to 2004.41' As terrible as this financial crisis has
been for many people, it serves as a counterweight to the era of
easy credit, over-indulgence, and over-leveraging. 416 Despite the
doom and gloom of a prolonged recession, the majority of
Americans are optimistic about what is in store for 2009.417
Americans look to a new president - who has made putting
people back to work and getting the economy moving again his top
priority - and themselves, to chart a better year than the one
passed.
Things will turn around and the market will come back to
normal after confidence is restored to the financial system and
investment capital can be convinced that it is safe to lay down the
cash once again. Perhaps confidence and credit will return when
Wall Street starts to forget the traumatic events of 2008.
Hopefully, in the not too distant future, we will be able to look
back on what is going on now and remember it is a blip on the
horizon. Perhaps by then, we will have learned some critical but
fundamental lessons: if we learn to live within our means, our
413. See June Fletcher, End Is in Sight for Housing Slump, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122522301876377101.html.
414. Id.
415. See Hirsch, supra note 28, at 44.
416. See Fletcher, supra note 413.
417. See Lilla Zuill, Americans optimistic 2009 will be a better year. poll, REUTERS,
Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE4BT3E720081230.
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society will be much healthier and happier in the long run. In
addition, "[j]ust because someone is offering to loan you money
doesn't mean you should take it;" "[d]on't assume lenders and
regulators will look after your interests; and "[b]efore you sign a
contract, read the fine print. 418 Perhaps most importantly, we can
hope that the worst of the financial crisis is over, because a new
year is, if nothing else, a new beginning and one step closer to
economic normalcy and brighter days ahead.
418. See Fletcher, supra note 413.
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